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Research with DecisionaHy Incapacitated Human Subjects:
An Argument for a Systemic Approach to Risk-Benefit
Assessment
CARL H. COLEMAN*
The amount of medical research with persons who lack decision-making capacity is
rapidly increasing, but in most states it takes place without clear legal authority. In
addition to creating significant liability risks for researchers and persons who provide
consent on behalf of incapacitated subjects, the lack of explicit legal standards means
that few, if any, safeguards exist to protect incapacitated persons ' rights and welfare.
Previous efforts to close the gap between clinical reality and legal requirements have
failed in part because they have not provided a coherent or persuasive ethical
justification for permitting this research. This Article seeks to fill that void by
proposing a new way of thinking about the ethics of research with incapacitated
persons, grounded in a long-term, systemic approach to risk-benefit assessment. This
approach explains why it is ultimately in incapacitated persons' best interests to be
governed by a policy that permits them to be enrolled in research without their
personal authorization--even if such a policy puts them at risk of participating in
studies that, when viewed in isolation, may involve more burdens than benefits. Unlike
other approaches, the framework developed here does not depend on false analogies
between participating in research and receiving medical treatment, or dubious claims
about family members' inherent authority or incapacitated persons' obligations to
society. Because the proposed framework directly responds to the criticism that
research with incapacitated persons is a form of exploitation, it may increase the
likelihood that proposals to authorize this research will actually be adopted. It also
has important implications for both how laws governing research with incapacitated
persons should be structured, and the roles and responsibilities of surrogate decision
makers.
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INTRODUCTION
Medical research with persons who lack decision-making capacity is in a state of
crisis. More research involving persons with Alzheimer's, schizophrenia, and other
capacity-impairing conditions is being conducted than ever before,' but in most states,
it takes place without any clear regulation. 2 As a result, few, if any, safeguards exist to
protect the rights and welfare of incapacitated research subjects, and surrogates who
are asked to provide consent on behalf of incapacitated persons have no meaningful
standards to help them determine whether they are making the right choice. Moreover,
the lack of legal authorization for this research means that those responsible for the
studies-both the researchers and the surrogates who provide consent-risk substantial
liability when, as will inevitably occur, an incapacitated subject suffers injury and a
lawsuit results.
In the late 1990s, a series of government commissions issued comprehensive
proposals to correct the gulf between current practice and legal requirements,3 but
none of these proposals was adopted.4 Some critics of the proposals reacted harshly to
the idea of giving formal legal approval to research involving persons who are
incapable of consenting; a few charged that such research was tantamount to the Nazis'
experimentation on concentration camp prisoners. 5 At the same time, many researchers
complained that the proposals were overly strict and would stifle scientific progress. 6
While a few states have since managed to achieve consensus on legislation authorizing
surrogate consent to research, these states remain in the minority.
Federal regulators have now decided to reopen the discussion. The Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS) has sought comments on the necessity of
developing new regulations governing research with incapacitated persons. 7 Its
Secretary's Advisory Committee for Human Research Protections formed a
subcommittee to develop recommendations on this category of research. Legislation
1. See infra text accompanying notes 29-30.
2. See Carol B. Stocking, Gavin W. Hougham, Aliza R. Baron, & Greg A. Sachs, Are the
Rules for Research with Subjects with Dementia Changing? 61 NEUROLOGY 1649, 1651 (2003)
("[TIhe process [of surrogate selection] appears to be unsystematic in most settings.").
3. See infra Part I.B.
4. See infra note 85.
5. See infra text accompanying note 117.
6. See infra text accompanying note 118.
7. See Jeannie Baumann, OHRP Asks for Comments on Protections for Decisionally
Impaired Research Subjects, 6 MED. REs. L. & POL'Y REP., Sept. 19, 2007, at 482.
8. Jeannie Baumann, Panel Leans Toward Guidance, Not Rules to Protect Decisionally
Impaired Subjects, 5 MED. RES. L. & POL'Y REP., Nov. 15, 2006, at 733.
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has also been proposed in the House of Representatives that would require DHHS "to
promulgate rules to enhance protections for human subjects with diminished
decisionmaking capacity." 9
Given the reactions to the previous commissions' efforts, these new policy
initiatives clearly face an uphill battle. To succeed, they will have to respond to two
very different groups of critics: those who believe that using incapacitated persons as
research subjects is inherently unethical, and those who believe that researchers should
be allowed to do what they want without significant limitations. Responding to both
groups will be impossible unless proposals to change the law are grounded in a more
persuasive ethical framework than those that have been advanced so far-a framework
that explains why a policy authorizing limited forms of research with incapacitated
persons is ethically preferable to either an outright prohibition or a more laissez-faire
approach.
The purpose of this Article is to provide such a framework. I begin by examining,
and rejecting, the conventional ethical arguments. First, I look at the framework
underlying the unsuccessful proposals of the federal, New York, and Maryland
commissions. Those proposals suggested that public policies authorizing research with
incapacitated persons could be justified by the same principles governing surrogate
consent to medical treatment-promoting the incapacitated person's wishes or best
interests. This claim, I argue, ignores critical distinctions between consenting to
research and consenting to medical care.
I then turn to several arguments raised in the academic literature. These include the
claims that (1) in the absence of knowledge to the contrary, we can presume that
incapacitated people would altruistically accept sacrifices for the benefit of other
people; (2) communitarian values of family autonomy justify deference to family
members' decisions to permit research with their incapacitated relatives; and (3)
incapacitated persons have an obligation to be research subjects as compensation for
the care-giving benefits that society has provided them. I argue that each of these
claims rests on either dubious empirical assumptions or ethical positions that are
incompatible with the basic premises of a liberal society.
After rejecting these approaches, I then develop an alternative way of thinking
about the ethics of public policies on research with incapacitated persons. The
framework I propose is based on two seemingly incompatible propositions. The first is
that participating in research often involves more burdens than benefits; this is one of
the fundamental differences between being a research subject and being a patient. The
second is that, despite the fact that participating in research is often undesirable, a
policy permitting research with incapacitated persons may nonetheless be in such
persons' long-term best interests. The reason that it may be in their best interests is that
such policies make it possible for scientists to conduct more types of research on
capacity-impairing conditions than would otherwise be permissible. Incapacitated
persons may receive substantial benefits from this additional research-not only from
the studies in which they personally participate, but also from studies involving other
incapacitated people that could not have been conducted unless the policy existed.
9. Jeannie Baumann, House Measure Would Apply Common Rule Consistently to All
Human Subject Research, 5 MED. REs. L. & POL'Y REp., Jun. 21, 2006, at 422.
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These two propositions suggest the following standard for determining whether a
policy permitting research with incapacitated persons is ethically acceptable: the risks
incapacitated persons will face from the policy (i.e., the risk of being enrolled in
burdensome research without their personal authorization) must be outweighed by the
benefits they can expect from the additional research related to their conditions that the
policy facilitates. In other words, at the level of public policy, the question is whether
the balance of burdens and benefits is fair to incapacitated persons from a long-term,
systemic perspective-not whether individuals will receive net benefits from each and
every study in which they are personally enrolled.
This long-term, systemic approach to risk-benefit assessment is consistent with
many of the specific policy recommendations proposed in the past. However,
grounding those recommendations in a different ethical framework has important
implications. First, on a practical level, it increases the likelihood that proposals to
authorize research with incapacitated persons will actually be adopted. Unlike other
approaches, the framework I develop does not claim that it is acceptable to impose
burdens on incapacitated persons solely for the benefit of others in the future. Instead,
it requires that any burdens placed upon incapacitated persons be outweighed by
potential systemic benefits to those same persons. It therefore directly responds to the
claim that permitting research with incapacitated persons is a form of exploitation, one
of the primary arguments that has stymied previous reform efforts.
Second, the ethical framework developed in this Article explains why the handful of
research consent statutes that currently exist, which authorize surrogate consent to
research with few substantive limitations, are largely inadequate. While the framework
I propose does not dispense with surrogates, it does not rely on surrogate consent as
the primary justification for enrolling incapacitated persons in research. Instead, the
acceptability of research with incapacitated persons depends more on the nature of the
study-specifically, whether it fits within a policy that provides a net benefit to
incapacitated people-than on the fact that a surrogate is willing to consent to it. By
de-emphasizing the surrogate's moral authority, this approach underscores the
importance of subjecting research with incapacitated persons to heightened regulatory
oversight,
Third, grounding public policies in a long-term, systemic approach to risk-benefit
assessment shows that, from an ethical perspective, limiting the risks faced by
incapacitated persons participating in research addresses only half the picture. At least
as important is facilitating incapacitated persons' abilities to reap the benefits of all
research related to their conditions-including studies involving other incapacitated
subjects. Thus, the framework demonstrates the necessity of linking policies on
surrogate consent to research to measures to promote incapacitated persons' access to
medical care-an issue not addressed by previous proposals.
Finally, the suggested approach has important implications for the process of
surrogate decision making. Because it does not pretend that decisions to enroll an
incapacitated person in research can usually be justified by the prospective subject's
wishes or best interests, it avoids misleading surrogates into believing that consenting
to research is no different from consenting to medical treatment. By making clear that
the benefits to incapacitated people come from the overall system of research-rather
than from participating in any particular study-it gives surrogates a more realistic
understanding of what they are being asked to decide.
Part I of this Article provides general background on the concept of decision-
making capacity and the types of research performed with incapacitated subjects. Part
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II explores the current legal regime governing this research and describes the
unsuccessful attempts by previous governmental commissions to change the law. Part
III critiques the standard ethical arguments that have been offered to justify laws
permitting research with incapacitated persons. Part IV proposes an alternative ethical
framework grounded in a long-term, systemic risk-benefit analysis, and explains the
implications of this framework for law and public policy.
I. MEDICAL BACKGROUND
A. Mental Impairments and Decision-Making Capacity
Numerous medical conditions can impair individuals' cognitive abilities. Some,
such as mental retardation, affect people for their entire lives. 1 Others develop later in
life, either suddenly (for example, a traumatic brain injury resulting from a car
accident)" or gradually (for example, Alzheimer's disease). 12 Some conditions, such
as persistent vegetative state, result in a permanent and total loss of ability to make any
decisions. 13 Others, including many mental illnesses, wax and wane over a person's
lifetime, sometimes causing profound impairment and other times having little or no
impact on cognitive function. 14
In the past, many persons with mental impairments were deemed legally
"incompetent," a judgment that rendered them powerless to make virtually any
important decisions on their own behalf '5 Over the past several decades, however, the
law has moved away from global determinations of "competence" and "incompetence"
towards more nuanced judgments about an individual's capacity to make particular
choices. 16 The contemporary approach to decision-making capacity is closely related
to the doctrine of informed consent: a person has the capacity to make a decision when
she can understand and appreciate the risks and benefits of the available options and
use that information as the basis for making an informed choice. 17
10. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 39-40 (4th ed. 1994).
11. See Eija Jumisko, Jan Lexell & Siv S6derberg, The Meaning of Living with Traumatic
Brain Injury in People with Moderate or Severe Traumatic Brain Injury, J. NEUROSCIENCE
NURSING, Feb. 2005 at 42.
12. See ALzHEuMER'S DISEASE EDUCATION AND REFERRAL (ADEAR) CENTER, A zHEIMER'S
DISEASE FACT SHEET (July 2006), available at http://www.nia.nih.gov (follow "Alzheimer's
Disease Information" hyperlink; then follow "general information" hyperlink; then follow "AD
Fact Sheet" hyperlink).
13. See AMERICAN ACADEMY OF NEUROLOGY, POSITION OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
NEUROLOGY ON CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE CARE AND MANAGEMENT OF THE PERSISTENT
VEGETATIVE STATE PATIENT (1989).
14. See THOMAS GRsso & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE TO CONSENT TO
TREATMENT: A GUIDE FOR PHYSICIANS AND OTHER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 1637 (1998).
15. See Lawrence A. Frolik, Plenary Guardianship: An Analysis, a Critique and a Proposal
for Reform, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 599, 601 (1981).
16. JESSICAW. BERG, PAUL S. APPELBAUM, LISA S. PARKER & CHARLES W. LiDz, INFORMED
CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 96 (2d ed. 2001).
17. See, e.g., In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 413 n.7 (N.J. 1987) ("A competent patient has a
clear understanding of the nature of his or her illness and prognosis, and of the risks and benefits
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This "decision-specific" approach to capacity means that it is possible for a person
to have the capacity to make some choices but not others. For example, a person in the
early stages of dementia may have the capacity to provide informed consent to
participate in a focus group discussion about her daily activities, but she may lack the
capacity to give informed consent to a more complicated placebo-controlled study of
an investigational drug. Similarly, a person's capacity to make particular decisions may
fluctuate over time, even over the course of a single day, depending on her ability to
understand and process information.' 8 The relationship between capacity and
understanding also means that persons who initially appear to lack decision-making
capacity can sometimes be rendered capable through education. In one study of
cognitively impaired patients with schizophrenia, for example, the patients initially
scored lower than a control group on a test of decisional capacity, but after an
educational intervention, the difference between the two groups virtually
disappeared. 19
In some cases, determining that an individual lacks decision-making capacity is
simple and uncontroversial. For example, no one would dispute that a comatose patient
lacks the capacity to make any decisions. In less straightforward situations, however,
capacity determinations raise a host of vexing dilemmas. At bottom, the concept of
decision-making capacity raises a basic epistemological question about the possibility
of truly knowing what is going on inside another person's head. Although this question
is not unique to capacity determinations, 20 it is especially salient in this context, given
that the entire process rests on judgments about the quality of other people's thought
processes. When definitive judgments are impossible, we must determine how much
evidence of understanding should be required before a person is considered to lack the
capacity to make a particular decision.
Underlying this determination are value judgments about the relative importance of
autonomy and protection. A low threshold for determining capacity-under which
individuals would be free to make any decision, no matter how risky, unless it is
manifestly clear that they lack even a rudimentary understanding of the
consequences-promotes the value of autonomy at the potential expense of
individuals' welfare. Setting the threshold for capacity high raises the opposite
problem, as it paternalistically limits individuals' abilities to decide which risks they
want to assume.
21
of the proposed treatment, and has the capacity to reason and make judgments about that
information.").
18. See Paul S. Appelbaum & Loren H. Roth, Clinical Issues in the Assessment of
Competency, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1462, 1465 (1981).
19. See Joan Stephenson, Probing Informed Consent in Schizophrenia Research, 281 J. AM.
MED. Ass'N 2273 (1999).
20. For example, it also arises when juries are asked to determine whether a witness is
credible.
21. As Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock explain:
In the conflict between the values of self-determination and patient well-being, a
tradeoff between avoiding two kinds of errors should be sought. The first error is
that of failing to protect a person from the harmful consequences of his or her
decision when the decision is the result of serious defects in the capacity to decide.
The second error is failing to permit someone to make a decision and turning the
decision over to another, when the patient is able to make the decision him- or
herself. With a stricter or higher standard for competence, more people will be
[Vol. 83:743
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Further complicating these questions is the fact that, even when mental impairments
do not affect individuals' abilities to understand and process information, they can
profoundly alter a person's emotions and attitudes, leading to choices that "are so
different that we might ask whether [a person's] decisions are truly his." 22 For
example, a severely depressed person may fully understand the risks associated with a
nontherapeutic experiment, but she may not care about the dangers because she no
longer places any value on being alive.
In light of this possibility, some scholars have argued that, in addition to assessing a
person's ability to understand information, it also is important to ask whether her
decisions are "stable over time and consistent with her values and goals." 23 Yet, while
there may be good reasons to question a person's decisions when they are wildly out of
character, part of being autonomous is having the right to change one's mind. The
challenge is distinguishing between situations where a person's judgment is clouded to
the point that she is no longer acting "authentically," 24 and other situations where her
behavior has changed so radically that she is essentially a different person.
In practice, these questions are usually dealt with through a sliding-scale approach
to capacity determinations. Thus, if an individual is making a decision that appears to
be consistent with her best interests, little evidence of her ability to appreciate the
risks, benefits, and alternatives will be required. However, if her decision appears to be
objectively unreasonable-for example, if she is refusing a minimally risky life-saving
intervention-her capacity is likely to be called into question.
25
In part, this approach can be explained on efficiency grounds: if someone is making
a clearly reasonable decision, it will make little difference whether she actually has
decision-making capacity, since if it is determined that she lacks capacity and a
surrogate decision maker is appointed, the surrogate will almost certainly go along
with the clearly reasonable choice. 26 At the same time, the approach reveals that
capacity determinations, in practice, are more about protecting people from harm than
promoting their autonomy. Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock, two of the leading
found incompetent, and the first error will be minimized at the cost of increasing
the second sort of error. With a looser or more minimal standard for competence,
fewer persons will be found incompetent, and the second sort of error is more
likely to be minimized at the cost of increasing the first.
Allen Buchanan & Dan W. Brock, Deciding for Others, 64 MILBANK Q. 17, 30-31 (1986).
22. Carl Elliott, Caring About Risks: Are Severely Depressed Patients Competent to
Consent to Research?, 54 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 113, 115 (1997); see also Marsha
Garrison, The Empire of Illness: Competence and Coercion in Health-Care Decision Making,
49 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 781, 829 (2007) ("[Ilt seems likely that depression acts as a
coercive influence that interferes with the patient's capacity to recognize her genuine
treatment preferences.").
23. Bernard Lo, Assessing Decision-Making Capacity, 18 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 193,
195 (1990); see also 1 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAvIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS:
THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER
RELATIONSHIP 171 (1982) (emphasizing the importance of "consistency between the person's
choice and that individual's underlying values").
24. Elliott, supra note 22.
25. See Buchanan & Brock, supra note 21, at 30-31.
26. Indeed, the surrogate may be legally required to do this. See infra text accompanying
notes 141-146.
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theorists in this area, defend the sliding-scale approach on just this basis: "[A] finding
of incompetence is more likely in precisely those instances in which the case for
paternalism is strongest--cases in which great harm can be easily avoided by taking
the decision out of the individual's hands."
27
The purpose of this Article is not to determine whether the concept of decision-
making capacity is coherent or justifiable. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note
that, under the prevailing approach to capacity determinations, at least some persons
with mental impairments will be deemed to lack the capacity to provide informed
consent to at least some types of research. Moreover, the fact that, in practice, capacity
is most likely to be called into question when individuals are making decisions that do
not appear to be consistent with their objective best interests suggests that questions
about capacity are likely to arise frequently in research. To understand why this is the
case, it is necessary to explore the risks and benefits of being a research subject, which
is the focus of the next section of this Article.
B. Types of Research with Decisionally Impaired Subjects
Persons with mental impairments are used as subjects in many types of medical
research.28 For example, in 2005, Alzheimer's patients were recruited to participate in
100 different clinical trials, representing a "significant growth in clinical testing of new
approaches to treatment, prevention and diagnosis" of the disease. 29 In addition, since
the 1990s, large-scale clinical research on schizophrenia, depression, and other mental
illnesses has burgeoned, leading to the development of new classes of drugs that "have
proved to be impressive moneymakers for the pharmaceutical industry."
30
This Part divides medical research with mentally impaired persons into two general
categories-studies involving a prospect of a direct benefit to the subjects ("direct-
benefit studies"), and studies in which no direct benefits to subjects are expected ("no-
direct-benefit studies"). The studies described in this Part are offered as examples
because they all involve conditions that can impair decision-making capacity. It is not
possible to tell from the published reports of these studies whether all of the subjects
were in fact decisionally incapacitated. In some of the studies, such as those involving
moderate depression, it is likely that many of the subjects had the capacity to make
their own decisions about whether to participate. However, in other studies, such as
those involving severe Alzheimer's, it is reasonable to assume that none of the subjects
had the capacity to consent on their own behalf.
27. Buchanan & Brock, supra note 21, at 40.
28. This Article focuses on studies involving drugs, medical devices, and other medical
procedures, because those are the studies where the potential for harm is the greatest. Examples
of other types of research that might involve incapacitated subjects include observational studies
in which no interventions are provided, and studies in which the sole interventions consist of
interviews or questionnaires.
29. ALZHEIMER's AsSOCIATION, 2006: THE YEAR IN ALZHEIMER SCIENCE,
http://www.alz.org/alzheimers diseaseresearch_ad.asp.
30. Erica Goode, Leading Drugs for Psychosis Come Under New Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES,
May 20, 2003, at Al.
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1. "Direct-Benefit" Studies
The first category of research involves studies in which subjects are given
potentially therapeutic medical interventions. Examples include clinical trials of new
drugs after early-phase safety testing has already been completed, or studies comparing
two treatments already used in clinical practice to see whether one of them is superior
to the other.
Subjects in these studies may receive direct medical benefits as a result of their
participation. For example, in one study, investigators sought to evaluate the use of
memantine in patients with moderate-to-severe Alzheimer's, a condition for which few
treatment options currently exist. 3' Subjects in the study were randomly assigned to
receive either memantine or a placebo. The researchers found that the subjects
receiving the memantine showed significantly less clinical deterioration than those
receiving the placebo. 32 For those subjects, enrolling in the study appears to have
provided a direct medical benefit-a reduction in symptoms that had not previously
been achievable.
However, while subjects may receive therapeutic benefits from participating in
these types of studies, it is important to remember that providing direct benefits to
subjects is not the purpose of the research. Instead, as with all research, the primary
goal is to develop generalized knowledge that may ultimately translate into beneficial
treatments for patients in the future.33 In order to make the results of a study
generalizable, researchers rely on a variety of methodological features that can create
risks that do not exist when a person receives individualized medical treatment outside
of a study.
34
For example, research protocols typically specify the precise dosages and timing of
drugs and other interventions; deviations to accommodate the idiosyncratic needs of
individual subjects are usually not allowed. 35 Research subjects also may be required
to do a variety of things that are not necessary for their own health care, but that are
helpful to the scientific project. Many of these things involve only minimal burdens,
such as staying in the hospital longer for observation or having blood drawn more
frequently. Others, however, can be much more significant. For example, subjects may
have to undergo invasive diagnostic procedures, including lumbar punctures (spinal
taps)-a procedure that, while usually safe, is known to carry a risk of "serious
neurological sequelae." 36 Some studies also involve periods of medication "washouts,"
31. Barry Reisberg, Rachelle Doody, Albrecht St6ffler, Frederick Schmitt, Steven Ferris &
Hans J6rg M6bius, Memantine in Moderate-to-Severe Alzheimer's Disease, 348 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1333 (2003).
32. See id.
33. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2008) (defining "research" as a "systematic investigation,
including research development, testing and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to
generalized knowledge").
34. See generally Carl H. Coleman, Duties to Subjects in Clinical Research, 58 VAND. L.
REV. 387, 396-402 (2005).
35. E. Haavi Morreim, Litigation in Clinical Research: Malpractice Doctrine Versus
Research Realities, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHics 474, 475 (2004).
36. A. Strachan & J. Train, Letter to the Editor, Lumbar Puncture and Headache:
Aspirating Cerebrospinal Fluid Speeds Up Procedure, 316 BRrr. MED. J. 1015, 1018 (1998).
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in which subjects' regular medications are replaced with placebos, to ensure that
subjects' reactions during the study are not being caused by their previous
medications. 
37
The process of randomization, in which subjects are randomly assigned to receive
either the investigational intervention, standard treatment, or, in some cases, a placebo,
also can pose risks to research subjects. Subjects randomized into a placebo control
group forego all possibility of benefiting from the experimental intervention, 38 but they
will nonetheless be exposed to the risks associated with the nontherapeutic aspects of
the study. Subjects assigned to an active arm of the study do not face this problem, but
they still forego the benefit of individualized diagnosis and treatment.
It is sometimes argued that randomization cannot harm subjects because clinical
trials are conducted only in the face of "clinical equipoise"-that is, when there is "an
honest, professional disagreement among expert clinicians" about the relative merits of
the investigational intervention and the available alternatives. 39 However, equipoise
assessments are based on the expected benefits and burdens of the interventions for the
37. See generally CARL H. COLEMAN, JERRY A. MENIKOFF, JESSE A. GOLDNER & NANCY
NEvELOFF DUBLER, THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS 271
(2005). Not all medication washouts are nontherapeutic. In one study conducted at UCLA,
researchers sought to identify factors that could help doctors determine which schizophrenic
patients could safely be taken off their medications without experiencing relapses. Subjects
were given medications for one year, following which they were either continued on their
medications or given a placebo. The study generated controversy when one subject in the
placebo group relapsed and committed suicide. Yet, while there were problems with the way in
which the study was conducted, it would not be accurate to characterize the study as
nontherapeutic. Subjects who were able to go off their medications without negative
consequences were freed of an unnecessary medication that can have intolerable side effects-a
clear benefit in the view of both schizophrenic patients and physicians. Indeed, the point of the
study was to determine whether medication washouts could be offered to some categories of
patients as a standard treatment. The study was therefore different from those in which taking
subjects off their medications is not expected to have any therapeutic benefit. Id. at 271-78.
38. Sometimes, however, studies are designed so that subjects who initially receive the
placebo will receive the experimental intervention later in the trial. See, e.g., Sarah A. Eagger,
R. Levy & Barbara J. Sahakian, Tacrine in Alzheimer's Disease, 337 LANCET 989 (1991). In
other cases, subjects in the placebo group are given the option of receiving the experimental
intervention after the study is over, assuming the experimental intervention is shown to be
effective. See, e.g., Martin R. Farlow, NMDA Receptor Antagonists: A New Therapeutic
Approach for Alzheimer's Disease, GERIATRICS, June 2004, at 22.
39. Benjamin Freedman, Equipoise and the Ethics of Clinical Research, 317 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 141, 144 (1987). The principle of clinical equipoise, if applied strictly, means that
"placebo-controlled trials are appropriate only when no effective treatment exists for a
particular condition, or when the treatments that exist are inadequate for a particular subset of
patients." COLEMAN Er AL.., supra note 37, at 262. However, the World Medical Association has
determined that placebo-controlled trials can be acceptable "even if proven therapy is
available," if there are "compelling and scientifically sound methodological reasons its use is
necessary to determine the efficacy or safety of a proposed prophylactic, diagnostic or
therapeutic method," or if the study involves "a minor condition and the patients who receive
placebo will not be subject to any additional risk of serious or irreversible harm." WORLD
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, NOTE OF CLARIFICATION ON PARAGRAPH 29 OF THE WORLD MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION DECLARATION OF HELSINKI (2002).
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overall patient population. Even when equipoise exists on a population level, particular
individuals may have unique characteristics or preferences that would make a
particular arm of the study a better option for them. 
4
In addition, it is important to remember that clinical trials are conducted because it
is unknown whether the investigational intervention is safe and effective. If it were
clear that the investigational intervention worked, there would be no point in
conducting the study. In a state of clinical equipoise, an investigational intervention
may prove to be superior, equal to, or even worse than existing alternatives. 4' For
example, in one recent study, nursing home residents who had been diagnosed with
both Alzheimer's and psychosis were randomly assigned to receive either risperidone
or a placebo.42 The study was conducted because previous reports had suggested that
risperidone might be effective in treating Alzheimer's-related psychosis. Ultimately,
the researchers found no statistically significant differences between the risperidone
and placebo groups in the study's primary outcome measures, but the risperidone
group experienced a significantly higher rate of adverse events. Indeed, outside the
area of mental impairments, there are numerous examples of much-hyped interventions
that were shown to be ineffective or harmful in controlled clinical trials, including
high-dose chemotherapy combined with bone marrow transplantation for breast
cancer,43 arthroscopic surgery for osteoarthritis of the knee,44 and fetal tissue
transplantation for Parkinson's patients.45
For some people, the risks of exposure to an unproven intervention may be offset by
the potential benefits that the intervention offers, especially if there are no good
standard treatments available. In many cases, however, enrolling in research is not the
only way to obtain the potential direct benefits associated with an investigational drug
or procedure. In general, physicians are free to offer investigational interventions to
their patients outside of a research study, provided they have a reasonable basis for
believing that the intervention will help the patient.46 The one exception relates to
treatments that require approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)--that
40. See Coleman, supra note 34, at 397-98.
41. See Lester M. Crawford, Acting Commissioner of the FDA, Speech before the Mayo
Alliance for Clinical Trials Conference (August 26, 2004), available at
http:llwww.fda.gov/oc/speeches/20041mayo0826.html ("We're currently seeing a 50 percent
failure rate among products in late-stage Phase 3 trials. 50 percent!").
42. Jacobo Mintzer, Andrew Greenspan, Ivo Caers, Ilse Van Hove, Stuart Kushner, Myron
Weiner, Georges Gharabawi & Lon S. Schneider, Risperidone in the Treatment of Psychosis of
Alzheimer Disease: Results from a Prospective Clinical Trial, 14 AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY
280, 280 (2006).
43. Jonas Bergh, Commentary, Where Next with Stem-Cell-Supported High-Dose Therapy
for Breast Cancer?, 355 LANcET 944 (2000).
44. See J. Bruce Moseley, Kimberly O'Malley, Nancy J. Petersen, Terri J. Menke, Baruch
A. Brody, David H. Kuykendall, John C. Hollingsworth, Carol M. Ashton & Nelda P. Wray, A
Controlled Trial ofArthroscopic Surgery for Osteoarthritis of the Knee, 347 NEw ENG. J. MED.
81(2002).
45. See Gina Kolata, Parkinson's Research Is Set Back by Failure of Fetal Cell Implants,
N.Y. TIMES, March 8,2001, at Al.
46. See Jerry Menikoff, The Hidden Alternative: Getting Investigational Treatments Off-
Study, 361 LANCET 63, 63 (2003).
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is, drugs, certain medical devices, and biologics (such as vaccines).47 As long as the
FDA has approved the use of the product for at least one purpose, physicians are free
to prescribe it to their patients for any other indication, assuming they have a
reasonable medical basis for doing so. 48 However, if the product has not been
approved for any purpose-for example, a new drug being tested in order to provide
data for a future approval application-physicians cannot prescribe it outside of a
clinical trial unless they get special approval from the FDA. Such approvals
(commonly known as "compassionate use" exemptions) are generally limited to drugs
intended to treat "serious and life-threatening illnesses for which there are no
satisfactory alternative treatments."
49
Yet studies involving unapproved drugs for which no compassionate use exemption
is available represent only a small fraction of human subject research currently being
conducted. As Jerry Menikoff points out, "[hiundreds, if not thousands of research
studies" involve investigational treatments that are "available not only in a randomised
research trial, but also as a treatment provided directly by a patient's doctor,
independent of a research study." 50 In these situations, persons interested in receiving
the experimental intervention could do so in the context of an individualized physician-
patient relationship, without assuming the inherent risks that being a research subject
entails.
2. "No-Direct-Benefit" Studies
In contrast to the studies described above, other types of research involve no
potential direct benefits to the subjects. In these studies, the sole goal is to develop
knowledge that may lead to improved treatments for future patients. Studies that fall
into this category include early-phase drug studies designed to learn how a drug is
metabolized or to identify side effects as well as basic physiological research about the
mechanisms of disease.
One type of no-direct-benefit research is the so-called "challenge study," in which
researchers expose the subjects to symptom-provoking stimuli in order to evaluate the
subjects' responses in a controlled clinical environment. In one study, for example,
researchers administered amphetamines to a small group of schizophrenic subjects and
47. See generally Patricia C. Kuszler, Financing Clinical Research and Experimental
Therapies: Payment Due, but from Whom?, 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 441,446-53 (2000)
(describing the FDA approval process).
48. See Menikoff, supra note 46, at 63.
49. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 147. In Abigail Alliance for Better Access to
Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006), a D.C. Circuit panel
held that terminally ill individuals had a constitutional right to access to unapproved drugs that
had passed early-phase safety testing, thereby calling into question the validity of the FDA's
compassionate use regulations. However, the decision was reversed en banc, 495 F.3d 695
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), and the Supreme Court denied certiorari, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008).
Prompted in part by the panel's decision, the FDA has undertaken efforts to clarify its
compassionate use rules. See Mark Barnes, Clinton D. Hermes, Katherine Jaral & Ellen
Moskowitz, Looking Back at 2006, Looking Ahead to 2007: 'Expanded Access,' Research
Billing, International Research, Grants Accounting, Catalona, Gene Therapy, and Central
IRBs, 6 MED. REs. L. & POL'Y REP., Jan. 3, 2007, at 14.
50. Menikoff, supra note 46, at 63.
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normal controls to see whether they would produce symptoms of spontaneous
dyskinesia (a type of spasmodic motion disorder). 51 The amphetamines offered no
potential medical benefits to the subjects; they were given solely to help the
researchers better understand the relationship between schizophrenia and dyskinesia.
Similarly, in another study, researchers administered carbon dioxide-a substance
known to trigger panic attacks in susceptible persons-to subjects with a variety of
mental disorders, including major depression. Here, the researchers' goal was to better
understand "the mechanism of action and the neurobiological significance" of carbon
dioxide-induced panic attacks.
52
Some no-direct-benefit studies involve significant periods of medication washouts.
For example, in one study, researchers sought to better understand the brain chemistry
of subjects with chronic schizophrenia. As part of the study, they administered lumbar
punctures to subjects who had been treated with the drug haloperidol for at least three
months. Then, the researchers replaced the haloperidol with a placebo and repeated the
lumbar punctures six weeks later. 53 The drug-free period enabled the researchers to
differentiate between activities attributable to the subjects' medications from those
associated with the underlying pathophysiology of schizophrenia. In a particularly
controversial example of a medication washout and challenge study, researchers at
Mount Sinai Medical Center in New York took schiiophrenic patients off their
medications and gave them a drug known to provoke psychotic symptoms. All of the
patients experienced relapses, and some of the patients became violent or suicidal.54
No-direct-benefit studies involving lumbar punctures, as in the schizophrenia study
described above, are relatively common in brain-related research. In one study of
subjects with Down's Syndrome and Alzheimer's disease, for example, the researchers
performed multiple lumbar punctures on the subjects in order to better understand the
mechanisms of certain chemical processes related to the subjects' illnesses. 55 In
51. Shawn L. Cassady, Helene Adami, Marianne Moran, Rick Kunkel, & Gunvant K.
Thaker, Spontaneous Dyskinesia in Subjects with Schizophrenic Spectrum Personality, 155 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 70 (1998).
52. Jack M. Gorman, Justine Kent, Jose Martinez, Susan Browne, Jeremy Coplan, & Laszlo
A. Papp, Physiological Changes During Carbon Dioxide Inhalation in Patients with Panic
Disorder, Major Depression, and Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder: Evidence for a Central
Fear Mechanism, 58 ARCHIvES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 125, 125 (2005). In another example of a
challenge study, subjects with major depression who had recently attempted suicide were given
the drug fenfluramine in order to identify differences in brain activity between "high-lethality"
and "low-lethality" suicide attempters. See Maria A. Oquendo, Giovanni P. A. Placidi, Kevin
M. Malone, Carl Campbell, John Keilp, Beth Brodsky, Lawrence S. Kegeles, Thomas B.
Cooper, Ramin V. Parsey, Ronald L. Van Heertum, & J. John Mann, Positron Emission
Tomography ofRegional Brain Metabolic Responses to a Serotonergic Challenge and Lethality
of Suicide Attempts in Major Depression, 60 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 14 (2003).
53. Peter M. Thompson, Mary Kelley, Jeffrey Yao, Guochuan Tsai, & Daniel P. van
Kammen, Elevated Cerebrospinal Fluid SNAP-25 in Schizophrenia, 53 BIOLOGICAL
PSYCHIATRY 1132, 1133 (2003).
54. See Dolores Kong, Study HarmedMentally l, Agency Reports, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 9,
1999, at A8 (reporting the National Institute of Health's Office for Protection from Research
Risks' criticism of the Mount Sinai study).
55. John R. Atack & Mark B. Schapiro, Inositol Monophosphatase Activity in Normal,
Down Syndrome and Dementia of the Alzheimer Type CSF, 23 NEUROBIOLOGY OF AGING 389
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another study, the researchers administered lumbar punctures to subjects with
Alzheimer's disease for the sole purpose of evaluating the stress associated with
receiving a lumbar puncture. The published report of that study noted that similar
efforts have been made to evaluate the stress associated with lumbar punctures in
persons with depression and schizophrenia.
5 6
The extent of no-direct-benefit research with subjects who lack decision-making
capacity is difficult to determine. In an effort to gauge the prevalence of this research,
the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) surveyed all studies published
in medical journals in the United States from 1995 to 1998 that met the following
criteria:
the research was recently conducted in the United States; it appeared to present
greater than minimal risk, and did not hold out the prospect of direct medical
benefit to subjects; the subjects were persons with mental disorders that may affect
decisionmaking capacity; and the research design included at least one of the
following: washout, placebo, or symptom provocation.
The survey uncovered sixty studies meeting all of these criteria, suggesting that risky,
no-direct-benefit studies are not an infrequent phenomenon.
NBAC also concluded that developing better treatments for capacity-impairing
conditions sometimes requires enrolling incapacitated persons in no-direct-benefit
studies. "[W]hen disease processes themselves are under study," NBAC observed, "the
absence of animal models for most psychiatric and many neurologic syndromes means
that research on both the underlying dynamics of disease and promising treatments
must, at some stage, involve human subjects. ' ,58 NBAC specifically noted the
usefulness of brain imaging techniques to "help identify the anatomic location of brain
areas involved in cognitive and affective functions," 59 procedures that offer no direct
benefits to the subjects and that some commentators have characterized as involving
more than minimal risk.6°
Individuals, or those who decide on their behalf, often have reasons for enrolling in
research that, in their view, outweigh the risks inherent in being a research subject. For
example, physicians may see research subjects more regularly, research subjects may
receive diagnostic tests that reveal important medical information, and, in some cases,
(2002).
56. Alan J. Lerner, Robert C. Elston, Chien Hsiun Chen, & Robert P. Friedland, Response
of the Hypothalamic-Pituitary-Adrenal Axis to Lumbar Puncture-Induced Stress, 2 J.
ALZHEuMER'S DISEASE 193 (2000).
57. 1 NATIONAL BioETHics ADVISORY COMMISSION, RESEARCH INVOLVING PERSONS WITH
MENTAL DISORDERS THAT MAY AFFECT DECISION-MAKING CAPACrrY 13 (1998) [hereinafter
NBAC REPORT].
58. Id. at 4.
59. Id. (quoting Nancy C. Andreasen, Daniel S. O'Leary & Stephan Arndt, Neuroimaging
and Clinical Neuroscience: Basic Issues and Principles, in 12 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC PRESS
REVIEw OF PSYCHIATRY, (John M. Oldham, Michelle B. Riba & Allan Tasman eds., 1993)).
60. See Rebecca Dresser, Research Involving Persons with Mental Disabilities: A Review
of Policy Issues and Proposals, 2 NATIONAL BIOErHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, RESEARCH
INVOLVING PERSONS WITH MENTAL DISORDERS THAT MAY AFFECT DECISIONMAKING CAPACITY
23 (1999).
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they might receive payment. For persons without health insurance, enrolling in a
medical research study may be the only way to obtain any medical attention.
62
Moreover, for some people, an important motivation for enrolling in a medical research
study is an altruistic desire to contribute to scientific progress. 63 However, while these
reasons may explain why some people choose to become research subjects, they do not
change the fact that research involves exposing people to risks that are not
therapeutically necessary, solely to obtain information that may help others in the
future. This is the conflict inherent in human subject research, and the primary reason
that medical research is subject to more extensive oversight than ordinary medical care.
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. The Existing Legal Framework Governing Research with Incapacitated Subjects
Most medical research conducted in this country is subject to federal human subject
protection regulations---either a set of regulations known as the Common Rule 64 (so
named because it has been promulgated in identical form by seventeen federal
agencies) or separate, but very similar, regulations promulgated by the FDA. 65 These
regulations require that multidisciplinary committees called "institutional review
boards" (IRBs) review and approve human subject research. As part of this review,
IRBs must determine that the "risks to subjects are reasonable in relation to anticipated
benefits" 6 and that, with the limited exceptions described below, 67 the researchers
have made adequate plans for obtaining the subjects' informed consent.68
61. See Nancy M. P. King, Defining and Describing Benefit Appropriately in Clinical
Trials, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 332, 333 (2000).
62. See REBECCA DRESSER, WHEN SCIENCE OFFERS SALVATION: PATIENT ADVOCACY AND
RESEARCH ETHICS 65 (2001) ("If opportunities to enroll in clinical trials increase, and the
number of people with adequate health coverage decreases, research will become a more
enticing means for low-income people to obtain a modicum of clinical attention.").
63. See Nancy E. Kass, Jeremy Sugarman, Ruth Faden & Monica Schoch-Spana, Trust:
The Fragile Foundation of Contemporary Biomedical Research, 26 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 25,
27 (1996).
64. 45 C.F.R. pt. 46. The Common Rule applies to all research conducted or supported by
the federal agencies that have adopted the rule. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (a) (2008). In addition, many
institutions that conduct federally-funded research have contractually agreed to comply with the
Common Rule in all their human subject research, regardless of the source of funding. See
COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 107.
65. 21 C.F.R. § 56.102 (2008). The FDA regulations apply to all "clinical investigations"
related to drugs, biologic products, or medical devices that are intended for "human use." 21
C.F.R. § 56.102(c), (1) (2008). Some research, such as federally-funded drug studies, are
covered by both the Common Rule and the FDA regulations. Other studies escape all federal
regulation, because they (1) are not conducted or supported by federal agencies; (2) are not
conducted in institutions that have agreed to apply the Common Rule to all their human subject
research; and (3) do not involve an FDA-regulated product.
66. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2) (2008); 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(2) (2008).
67. See infra text accompanying notes 77-80.
68. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(4) (2008); 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(4) (2008). IRBs also must
determine that risks to subjects are minimized, that the selection of subjects are equitable, and
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The centrality of informed consent to the oversight of human subject research has
both historical and theoretical explanations. As a historical matter, the contemporary
human subject protection system was created largely in response to egregious instances
of nonconsensual research. The most notorious examples, of course, were the sadistic
medical experiments conducted in concentration camps in Nazi Germany. 69 In reaction
to these atrocities, an American military tribunal set forth ten "basic principles" to
govern human experimentation, known as the Nuremberg Code. The Code's first
principle declares that "[t]he voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely
essential.,
70
In the United States, scandals involving nonconsensual research were among the
primary motivations for the enactment of the National Research Act of 1974, 7' which
provides the statutory basis for the current human subject protection regulations.72
These scandals included the U.S. Public Health Service's decades-long study of
syphilis among unsuspecting African-American men in Tuskegee, Alabama,73 as well
as other cases in which patients were enrolled in dangerous medical experiments
without their knowledge or consent.
74
Theoretically, the emphasis on informed consent reflects the Kantian influences
underlying the contemporary system of human subject protection. For a Kantian,
research with human subjects is deeply problematic, as it involves the use of persons
not as ends in themselves, but as the means of developing knowledge for the benefit of
others. Thus, on its face, research with human subjects appears to violate Kant's
categorical imperative, which directs us never to treat people as simply a means to
another person's ends.75 Writing shortly before Congress enacted the National
Research Act, the philosopher Hans Jonas argued that the way around this dilemma
was to ensure that subjects were sufficiently invested in the study so that the goals of
the study became the subject's own goals. This solution requires that the subject have
"such authentic identification with the cause that it is the subject's, as well as the
researcher's cause-whereby his role in its service is not just permitted by him, but
that appropriate measures are in place to monitor the research and to protect subjects'
confidentiality. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2008); 21 C.F.R. § 56.111 (2008).
69. See generally ROBERT JAY LIFTON, THE NAzI DOCTORS: MEDICAL KILLING AND THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF GENOCIDE (1986).
70. THE NUREMBERG CODE 1 1, reprinted in COLEMAN ET AL. ET AL., supra note 37, at 27.
71. Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (1974).
72. See ALBERT R. JONSEN, THE BIRTH OF BIOETHICs 142-48 (1998).
73. The Tuskegee study was designed to "document the natural history" of untreated
syphilis. The subjects in the study were poor African-American sharecroppers, and "government
officials went to extreme lengths to ensure that they received no therapy from any source."
TUSKEGEE SYPHILIs STUDY LEGACY COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT OF THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS
STUDY LEGACY COMMITrEE (1996), available at
http://www.healthsystem.virginia.edu/intemet/library/historical/medical-history/bad-blood/repo
rt.cfm.
74. See Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1354
(1966). In one of the studies Beecher described, researchers injected live cancer cells into
indigent, elderly patients at the Brooklyn Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital. Id. at 1358. In
another study, children at a state facility for "mentally defective persons" were deliberately
infected with hepatitis. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at 39-40.
75. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
350-51 (5th ed. 2001).
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willed.",76 This situation is only possible if the subject genuinely understands the risks
and the potential benefits of the research and decides that the value to society justifies
the personal risk to herself.
77
Yet, unlike the absolutist language of the Nuremberg Code's first principle, the
federal regulations recognize that conducting medical research without first obtaining
the subjects' informed consent can sometimes be acceptable. First, in some cases, the
regulations permit IRBs to waive the usual informed consent requirements. Most
waivers of informed consent fall into one of two categories.78 The first category
involves minimal-risk studies where the research could not "practicably be carried out"
without the waiver. 79 For example, if researchers wanted to review the medical records
of the patients who were admitted to a particular hospital during the past year,
obtaining the subjects' informed consent would require them to track down and contact
thousands of people-an extremely costly and perhaps impossible task. If the IRB
determines that the risks of this study are minimal, it may waive the requirement of
obtaining informed consent. 80
The second category involves research during emergencies, where the subjects lack
the capacity to provide informed consent and the surrogate decision makers cannot be
located in time. The regulations permit IRBs to waive the informed consent
requirement in these situations if certain criteria are satisfied, including that "subjects
are facing a life-threatening situation that necessitates intervention," that available
treatments are "unproven or unsatisfactory," and that the experimental intervention
offers the subjects a potential direct benefit with a "reasonable" amount of risk.8'
The focus of this Article, however, is not situations in which informed consent is
unnecessary, but rather studies in which informed consent is important, but the subjects
lack the capacity to provide it. In these situations, the federal regulations direct the
researchers to obtain informed consent from the subjects' "legally authorized
representative. 8 2 The regulations define "legally authorized representative" as "an
76. Hans Jonas, Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects, 98
DAEDALUS 219 (1969), reprinted in JAY KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS: THE
AUTHORITY OF THE INVESTIGATOR, SUBJECT, PROFESSIONS AND STATE IN THE HUMAN
EXPERIMENTATION PROCESs 668 (1972).
77. See id.
78. In addition to the two categories described in the text, waivers of informed consent are
also available in certain studies of public benefit programs. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(c) (2008).
79. Id. at § 46.116(d).
80. Another way to conduct such a study would be for the researchers to record only non-
identifying information from the medical records, which would make the study exempt from the
Common Rule. Id. at § 101(b)(4) (exempting studies involving the review of existing records "if
the information is recorded by the investigator in such a manner that subjects cannot be
identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects").
81. 21 C.F.R. § 50.24 (2008).
82. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2008); 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2008). In addition to the provisions on
legally authorized representatives, the regulations contain three other references to mentally
disabled subjects. First, they provide that, if an IR regularly reviews research involving
vulnerable populations, including mentally disabled subjects, "consideration shall be given to
the inclusion [on the IRB] of one or more individuals who are knowledgeable about and
experienced in working with these subjects." 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a) (2008). Second, in
determining whether the "selection of subjects is equitable," the IRB "should be particularly
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individual or judicial or other body authorized under applicable law to consent on
behalf of a prospective subject to the subject's participation in the procedure(s)
involved in the research."8 3 Because consent to medical procedures is largely governed
by state law,84 this definition has the effect of delegating the authority to identify the
"legally authorized representative" to the law of the state in which a study is being
conducted. The federal regulations are silent on the substantive standards the legally
authorized representative must apply in deciding whether to consent to research on
behalf of an incapacitated person. Presumably, the state law from which the legally
authorized representative derives his or her authority would govern this issue.8
5
Yet only a handful of states have laws that unambiguously identify who has legal
authority to consent to research with incapacitated persons.8 6 One example of such a
law is a California statute on medical experimentation, which was enacted at the urging
of the research community in 2002.87 The California statute provides a priority list of
potential surrogates, starting with a person empowered to make health care decisions
pursuant to an advance health care directive, moving to a court-appointed guardian,
and then turning to a spouse, domestic partner, or other relative.88 Aside from
California and a few other states, however, most state laws that directly relate to
research with incapacitated persons are designed to limit, not facilitate, researchers'
ability to rely on surrogate consent. Some states, for example, prohibit or sharply
restrict research with decisionally incapacitated persons who reside in state mental
health facilities. 89 Other states provide that court-appointed guardians may not consent
cognizant of the special problems of research involving vulnerable populations," including
mentally disabled subjects. 45 C.F.R. § 46.11 l(a)(3) (2008). Third, IRBs should ensure that,
"[w]hen some or all of the subjects are likely to be vulnerable to coercion or undue influence,
such as ... mentally disabled persons... additional safeguards have been included in the study
to protect the rights and welfare of these subjects." 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (b) (2008).
83. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(c) (2008); 21 C.F.R. § 50.3(1) (2008).
84. See Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270-72 (2006).
85. In at least one situation, however, federal law provides additional substantive
restrictions. See 10 U.S.C. § 980(a)(2) (2000) (providing that funds appropriated by the
Department of Defense may not be used for research with incapacitated subjects unless the
research is "intended to be beneficial to the subject" and "the informed consent of the subject or
a legal representative of the subject is obtained in advance").
86. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24178 (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4974 (2006);
N.J. STAT. § 26:14-1 (2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-162.18(B) (2008), 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE §
5-20-40 (2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3102A (2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-5-132(d)(iii)
(2007). Some states have statutes authorizing surrogate consent to "experimental treatment" for
certain incapacitated patients. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 393.13(4)(c)(6) (2007). However,
these statutes would probably exclude studies that do not offer a prospect of direct medical
benefit, as such studies could not plausibly be considered a form of treatment.
87. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24178; see also COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 37, at
608-09 (discussing the history behind the California statute).
88. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24178(c).
89. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.830 (2008) (stating that "experimental treatments involving
any significant risk of physical or psychological harm may not be administered to a patient" in a
state mental health facility); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5175(f) (2008) ("No [resident of a state
mental hospital] shall be approached to participate in pharmaceutical research if patient is
incapable of understanding the nature and consequences of patient's consent."); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 630.192 (West 2007) (prohibiting research in state-funded or licensed mental health facilities
"unless such research is intended to alleviate or prevent the disabling conditions or is reasonably
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to research on behalf of an incapacitated person without express court approval. 9°
Many of these statutes require the court to determine that participating in research
would be in the incapacitated person's best interests.
91
Most states, however, neither authorize nor prohibit surrogate consent to research.
Instead, the law is simply silent on the issue. In these states, the only health care
surrogacy laws that exist apply to medical treatment. For example, court-appointed
guardians can make decisions about medical treatment for incapacitated patients. 92 In
addition, competent individuals can execute "health care proxies," in which they
designate another person to make medical decisions for them in the event of a future
loss of decision-making capacity. 93 Most states also permit family members, and
sometimes close friends, to make at least some types of medical decisions for
incapacitated persons who have not created health care proxies or left clear instructions
about their treatment wishes. 94 In general, surrogate decision makers must make
decisions according to the patient's wishes or, if the patient's wishes are unknown and
cannot be determined, according to the patient's best interests.
95
It is unclear, however, whether laws that authorize surrogate decision making about
medical treatment provide a sufficient basis for designating a "legally authorized
representative" under the federal regulations. As noted above, a "legally authorized
representative" is defined as a person authorized "to consent on behalf of a prospective
subject to the subject's participation in the procedure(s) involved in the research., 96
This definition is susceptible to two different interpretations, depending on how the
phrase "the procedure(s) involved in the research" is construed. On the one hand, if
"procedure(s)" refers to discrete interventions, regardless of their purpose-for
example, the administration of drugs, or surgical procedures-then anyone with the
legal authority to make medical decisions for an incapacitated person could be
expected to be of direct therapeutic benefit to the participants," and further providing that no
research may be performed on involuntarily committed persons without a court order).
90. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-302 (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:25(I)(c)
(2008); 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-110 (West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-677(e)(6)
(2007) (requiring that research be approved by an IRB and the patient's primary physician and
endorsed by the state Department of Mental Retardation).
91. See, e.g., 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-110 (West 2008).
92. See generally Joan L. O'Sullivan, Role of the Attorney for the Alleged Incapacitated
Person, 31 STETSON L. REV. 687, 689-94 (2002) (discussing the history and powers of
guardianship).
93. See CHARLES P. SABATINO, ABA COMMISSION ON LAW AND AGING, 10 LEGAL MYTHS
ABOUT ADVANCE MEDICAL DIRECTIVES 5, available at http://www.abanet.org/aging/
publications/docs/l0legalmythsarticle.pdf.
94. See generally ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE §§ 5.17-.21 (2d ed. 1995). For a
summary of state statutes, see ABA COMMISSION ON LAW AND AGING, SURROGATE CONSENT IN
THE ABSENCE OF AN ADVANCE DIRECTIVE, available at http://www.abanet.org/aging/
legislativeupdates/docs/Famcon_05-07.pdf [hereinafter ABA COMMISSION, SURROGATE
CONSENT].
95. See MEISEL, supra note 94, at § 7.3 (describing a continuum of standards, ranging from
a "subjective standard" based on "knowledge of the patient's actual ('subjective') wishes," to a
"substituted judgment" standard, in which the patient's wishes are "inferred from the patient's
statements and conduct," to a pure "best interests" standard, which "reflects and seeks to
implement the value of welfare or well-being, rather than self-determination or autonomy")
(emphases omitted).
96. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(c) (2008).
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considered a "legally authorized representative" for purposes of research. This
interpretation would even apply to studies where the "procedures" to be employed are
unrelated to the subjects' medical needs. On the other hand, if "the procedure(s)
involved in the research" refers more narrowly to experimental procedures, or to other
unique features of research like randomized treatment assignments or the use of
placebo controls, simply having the authority to consent to ordinary medical treatment
would not be sufficient. Instead, the law would have to "not only identify an individual
who can consent to medical treatment on behalf of a patient, but ... also an individual
who can consent specifically to treatment delivered in the context of research. 97
So far, the federal Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP), which oversees
research conducted or supported by DHHS, has let research institutions decide for
themselves whether state surrogate decision-making laws provide a sufficient basis for
appointing a "legally authorized representative" under the federal regulations. For
example, in an investigation of a study involving the use of ventilators for
incapacitated persons with severe lung injuries, OHRP requested information from
Duke University about surrogates' legal authority to provide informed consent under
North Carolina law. Duke's response was that it interpreted a North Carolina statute
authorizing surrogate decision making about "health care" as a sufficient basis for
allowing surrogate consent to the ventilator study. OHRP neither endorsed nor rejected
Duke's interpretation of the North Carolina law, but simply "acknowledged" the
information provided by Duke and took no further action.98 Yet, while this
acknowledgment suggests that OHRP did not object to Duke's reliance on the North
Carolina statute, it is far from an unequivocal endorsement of the applicability of
medical surrogacy statutes to all decisions about research, particularly studies not
involving a prospect of direct benefit. Moreover, because it does not reflect an official
agency interpretation of the regulatory language, it is unlikely that it would receive
deference if the issue came before a court.99
No court has yet decided whether state laws governing surrogate consent to
treatment can be extended to decisions about research. However, courts' reactions to
previous cases involving research with persons incapable of consenting suggest that
judges may be skeptical of efforts to interpret the scope of surrogates' authority
broadly. In T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health,'O° for example, a New
York state court struck down regulations permitting surrogate consent to no-direct-
benefit research involving more than minimal risk in facilities run by the state Office
of Mental Health. While the decision ultimately turned on the fact that the regulations
had been promulgated by the wrong administrative agency, five appellate judges also
97. Michele Russell-Einhom & Thomas Puglisi, Three Exceptions to the Requirement to
Obtain Informed Consent in Research, 1 MED. RES. L. & POL'Y REP., Nov. 6, 2002, at 514.
98. See Letter from Leslie K. Ball, Compliance Oversight Coordinator, OHRP, to Ralph
Snyderman, President, Duke University Health System (Feb. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/detrm-letrslYRO2/febO2a.pdf.
99. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,228 (2001) ("The weight [accorded to
an administrative] judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control.") (alteration in original) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
100. 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (App. Div. 1996), appeal dismissed, 690 N.E.2d 1259 (N.Y. 1997).
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found that the regulations violated incapacitated persons' constitutional right to
procedural due process and "the common law right to personal autonomy.''0 ° In
addition, in a 2001 decision involving pediatric research, the Maryland Court of
Appeals concluded that parents lacked the authority under state law to enroll their
children in nontherapeutic studies involving more than "any articulable risk beyond the
minimal kind of risk that is inherent in any endeavor." 102 As explained below, parents'
authority to make decisions for their minor children stands on much stronger legal
footing than the authority of surrogates to make decisions on behalf of incapacitated
adults. 0 3 Thus, while the Maryland decision applied only to parental decisions for
children, it is reasonable to assume that the court would be equally critical of surrogate
consent to research with incapacitated adults, particularly in the absence of explicit
legislative authorization for the practice.
B. Law Reform Proposals
Efforts to reform the law governing research with incapacitated persons date back to
the early 1970s, when the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (DHEW, the
predecessor of DHHS) formed a committee to develop recommendations on research
with "mentally infirm" subjects. 104 Shortly after this process began, Congress enacted
the National Research Act, which established the National Commission for the
Protection of Human Subjects in Biomedical and Behavioral Research. One of the
tasks with which the Commission was charged was to develop recommendations for
policies regarding research on subjects "institutionalized as mentally infirm."' 10 5
DHEW put its project on hold pending the receipt of the National Commission's
recommendations. After those recommendations were issued in 1978, DHEW released
its final regulatory proposal, which would have authorized research with incapacitated
persons subject to certain limitations. For example, the regulations would have
required the approval of a national ethics committee before no-direct-benefit studies
involving more than a "minor increase above minimal risk" could be conducted with
institutionalized incapacitated subjects. 106 They also would have required the use of
101. Id. at 176. The New York Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that it was
unnecessary to reach the constitutional and common law questions, and it therefore vacated
those portions of the intermediate appellate court's decision. See T.D., 690 N.E.2d at 1260.
102. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 862 (Md. 2001); see also id. at 814
("[P]arents ... have no more right to intentionally and unnecessarily place children in
potentially hazardous nontherapeutic research surroundings ... than do researchers. In such
cases, parental consent, no matter how informed, is insufficient."). The Grimes decision placed
greater restrictions on research with children than the federal regulations, which permit no-
direct-benefit research involving more than minimal risks in limited circumstances. 45 C.F.R.
§§ 46.406-.407 (2008).
103. See infra text accompanying notes 175-81.
104. Diane E. Hoffmann, Jack Schwartz & Evan G. DeRenzo, Regulating Research with
Decisionally Impaired Individuals: Are We Making Progress?, 3 DEPAuL J. HEALTH CARE L.
547, 551-52 (2000).
105. Id. at551-55.
106. Id. at 565. Existing regulations on research with children contain a similar requirement.
See 45 C.F.R. § 46.407 (2008).
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"consent auditors" in many types of research. 0 7 The DHEW proposal was never
adopted, in large part because the research community found the proposed limitations
overly burdensome. 108
Over the next two decades, despite the increasing amount of research being
conducted with incapacitated subjects, "there were no new significant efforts to
regulate research with the decisionally impaired population." 109 This situation changed
in the late 1990s. In response to the T.D. decision, " 0 the New York State Department
of Health convened an Advisory Work Group on Research Involving the Protected
Classes (NYSAWG) to develop a new set of regulations authorizing research with
decisionally incapacitated subjects."' Coincidentally, NBAC, whose mandate included
issues related to human subject research, was also turning its attention to research with
incapacitated persons. 112 In addition, the Maryland Attorney General's office, which
has long been at the forefront of bioethics-related policy initiatives, had created a
committee to develop recommendations on the same issue." 
3
While there were some differences among the three commissions' proposals, in
general they echoed the overall conclusions of the 1978 DHEW recommendations. All
of the commissions agreed that surrogates should be permitted to consent to direct-
benefit research for incapacitated persons, as well as to no-direct-benefit research
involving minimal risk. 114 They also agreed that no-direct-benefit studies involving
more than minimal risks should be permissible under some circumstances, although
they disagreed on the specific rules that should govern this category of research. 115 In
107. Hoffmann et al., supra note 104, at 563-64.
108. See id. at 568.
109. Id. at 569.
110. See supra text accompanying notesl00-101.
111. ADVISORY WORK GROUP ON HUMAN SUBJECT RESEARCH INVOLVING THE PROTECTED
CLASSES, N.Y. STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE OVERSIGHT OF
HUMAN SUBJECT RESEARCH INVOLVING THE PROTECTED CLASSES 26 (1998) [hereinafter
NYSAWG REPORT]. The author of this Article served as a staff member to the NYSAWG.
112. NBAC REPORT, supra note 57.
113. See Diane E. Hoffmann & Jack Schwartz, Proxy Consent to Participation of the
Decisionally Impaired on Medical Research-Maryland's Policy Initiative, I J. HEALTH CARE
L. &POL'Y 123, 140-46 (1998).
114. See NYSAWG REPORT, supra note 111, at 26; NBAC REPORT, supra note 57, at 60-62;
Hoffmann & Schwartz, supra note 113, at 140-46.
115. NBAC recommended that surrogate consent to such research be permitted only if the
study receives approval from a national ethics panel. See NBAC REPORT, supra note 57, at 58-
60. The NYSAWG, by contrast, concluded that surrogates should be permitted to consent to no-
direct-benefit research involving a "minor increase over minimal risk" without special national
approval. However, the NYSAWG recommendations limited no-direct-benefit studies involving
more than a minor increase over minimal risk to persons who had expressly authorized such
research before losing capacity. NYSAWG REPORT, supra note 111, at 25, 32-33. The
Maryland commission fell somewhere between these two approaches: It concluded that
decision-makers appointed by the prospective subject through a health care proxy (i.e., "health
care agents") should be permitted to consent to no-direct-benefit research involving a minor
increase over minimal risk, but that surrogates not appointed by the prospective subject should
not have this authority. Like the NYSAWG, the Maryland commission would have limited no-
direct-benefit research involving more than a minor increase over minimal risk to persons who
had expressly authorized such research while competent. See Hoffmann & Schwartz, supra note
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addition to setting forth categories of permissible research, the reports addressed issues
such as the process of capacity assessment, the involvement of incapacitated subjects
in the decision-making process, and the monitoring of ongoing research.
The proposals were not uniformly well received. On the one hand, some critics
argued that allowing research with incapacitated persons would "open[] the door to
exploitation of vulnerable people."1 16 The recommendations to authorize some forms
of no-direct-benefit research were especially controversial. Criticizing the NYSAWG
proposal on this basis, John Cardinal O'Connor, then the Archbishop of New York,
stated that "every one of us perhaps could profit by a periodic reminder that much of
what was done under the Nazi regime under Hitler began long before with the
experiments of psychiatrists and other medical persons on people who are
psychologically incapacitated." 117 On the other hand, the research community argued
that the proposals would stifle valuable medical studies. 118 Researchers appeared to
prefer conducting their work without clear legal authority to a system that would
authorize their activities but subject them to more stringent regulation.
In the years since the commission proposals were rejected, a few states have passed
laws authorizing research with incapacitated persons." 9 The fact that these laws were
enacted shows that achieving consensus on research with incapacitated persons is not
impossible. However, the existing statutes are not nearly as comprehensive as the
rejected commission proposals; in essence, they simply authorize surrogate consent to
research without any significant safeguards. Moreover, these laws are isolated
exceptions. In the vast majority of states, research with incapacitated persons continues
to operate in the shadow of the law.
I. THE UNDERLYING ETHICAL DILEMMA: SEARCHING FOR A JUSTIFICATION FOR
RESEARCH WITH INCAPACITATED SUBJECTS
As explained above, the amount of research with incapacitated persons is growing,
but in most states, it takes place without clear legal authority. Yet many previous
proposals to change the law have met with considerable resistance, both from those
who believe the proposals are too permissive and from researchers who consider the
same proposals too restrictive. One reason for this stalemate is that efforts to change
the law have not been supported by a coherent ethical framework. The initial question
that must be answered is why laws authorizing limited forms of research with
incapacitated persons are ethically preferable to either prohibiting such research or
maintaining the status quo.
In this Part, I explain the problems with the standard ethical arguments that have
been offered in support of laws permitting research with incapacitated persons. I begin
with the argument that research with incapacitated persons can be justified by the
principles governing surrogate consent to medical treatment. After explaining why the
analogy to medical treatment cannot be supported, I examine alternative justifications
113, at 141-46.
116. Hoffmann et al., supra note 104, at 592.
117. Naomi Toy & Gregg Birnbaum, O'Connor: No-Consent Testing Recalls Nazis, N.Y.
POST, Jan. 18, 1999, at 5.
118. Hoffmann et al., supra note 104, at 592.
119. See supra note 86.
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for research with incapacitated persons offered in the academic literature. These
approaches also do not provide an adequate foundation for policy reform.
A. The Medical Treatment Analogy
All states recognize at least some forms of surrogate decision making for medical
treatment. 120 The general standard for surrogate decisions about treatment is that the
decisions must promote the wishes or best interests of the incapacitated person.1
21
Previous proposals to authorize surrogate consent to medical research have directly
appealed to this wishes/best interest framework. The NBAC, for example, argued that
surrogates should base their decisions on "a best estimation of what the subject would
have chosen if capable of making a decision" or, if the surrogate is unable to identify
"any evidence about the person's values and preferences," on "judgments about that
person's 'best interests." 122 The language of wishes and best interests also appears in
the NYSAWG and Maryland commission reports,' 23 and it is the standard underlying
California's statute on "medical experimentation." 1
24
This Section argues that the principles governing surrogate consent to treatment do
not provide an adequate foundation for authorizing surrogates to enroll incapacitated
persons in research. First, unlike treatment decisions, decisions to enroll incapacitated
persons in research usually cannot be justified by appealing to those persons' wishes or
best interests. Second, the reasons we defer to surrogates' assessment of incapacitated
persons' wishes and best interests in the treatment context do not necessarily apply to
medical research.
1. The Wishes/Best Interests Framework
The standards applicable to surrogate decisions about medical treatment-
promoting the wishes or best interests of the incapacitated person-cannot always be
reconciled with the realities of medical research. First, it is difficult enough for
surrogates to determine what decisions incapacitated persons would have made about
120. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
121. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
122. NBAC REPORT, supra note 57, at 62.
123. NYSAWG REPORT, supra note 111, at 32-33; Hoffmann & Schwartz, supra note 113,
at 140.
124. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24178(g) (West 2006) (requiring surrogates to
make decisions "in accordance with the person's individual health care instructions, if any, and
other wishes, to the extent known to the surrogate decisionmaker," or if those wishes are not
known, "in accordance with the person's best interests"). By contrast, the New Jersey statute
provides that, if the incapacitated person's wishes are not known, the surrogate "shall make a
decision in accordance with the subject's personal values and his best estimation of what the
subject would have chosen if he were capable of making a decision." N.J. STAT. § 26:14-5.d.
The statute does not incorporate the best interests standard. Other research consent statutes
state only that the surrogate may not make decisions that contravene what is known about the
patient's wishes or values. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4974 (2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 §
3102A (West 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-162.18(B) (2004). Under these statutes, if the
patient's prior wishes cannot be determined, the surrogate would appear to have unlimited
authority to consent to any IRB-approved study.
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ordinary medical treatment. 25 Those difficulties are significantly greater when
surrogates attempt to assess incapacitated persons' wishes about medical research.
When surrogates make treatment decisions, they can draw on a variety of sources of
information, even in the absence of clear instructions by the patient. For example,
because most people undergo numerous medical interventions throughout their lives,
surrogates may be able to infer incapacitated persons' preferences about medical
treatment from the patient's reactions to prior experiences. Similarly, many people
reveal their preferences about medical treatment in the course of discussing the
experiences of family members, friends, or people in the news. 126 Because far fewer
people will have had any experiences related to medical research, these sources of
information are less likely to be available when surrogates are considering enrolling an
incapacitated person in a study.
Moreover, even when some evidence of an incapacitated person's preferences about
research exists, that evidence often will not provide reliable information about what the
person would have decided after being fully informed about the risks and benefits of
enrolling in a particular study. For example, some people may have expressed a desire
to participate in research because they thought that doing so would give them access to
"cutting-edge" experimental therapies. They may not have been aware of the fact that
being a research subject also involves inherent risks, such as randomized treatment
assignments (including the possibility of being randomly assigned to a placebo-control
arm), inflexible treatment protocols, and the use of risky, nontherapeutic
interventions. 127 In addition, people generally do not realize that the experimental
interventions offered in clinical trials can often be obtained from a physician without
enrolling in a study. 12 8 Thus, the fact that someone has expressed a desire to "pursue
experimental therapies," or even to "participate in a clinical trial," does not necessarily
mean that she would have agreed to be a research subject once the risks and benefits
were made clear. Such evidence certainly does not mean that the person would have
agreed to be a subject in a study that does not offer any potential direct benefit, such as
the symptom-provoking challenge studies described in Part 1.129
Finally, for studies related to certain medical conditions, it will never be possible to
rely on evidence of the prospective subject's prior wishes about research, because
persons suffering from those conditions have lacked decision-making capacity for their
entire lives. This would be true, for example, in a study designed to test a new
treatment for severe mental retardation, in which all of the prospective subjects have
the mental age of a young child. Because none of these persons ever had the ability to
provide informed consent to any medical interventions, surrogates cannot base their
125. See infra text accompanying note 152.
126. See, e.g., In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 953 (Me. 1987) (noting that the patient "had
specifically observed friends and neighbors in desperate medical straits and had declared that he
did not want to be kept alive artificially if he ever came into that condition"); In re Eichner, 420
N.E.2d 64, 68, 72 (N.Y. 1981) (finding clear and convincing evidence of the patient's prior
decision to refuse a respirator, in part based on the patient's comments about the Karen Ann
Quinlan case).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 34-40.
128. See supra text accompanying note 50.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
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decisions on what the prospective subjects would have chosen for themselves if they
were fully informed.
The difficulty of determining incapacitated persons' wishes means that, if the
standards applicable to treatment decisions are extended to medical research, decisions
about research enrollment will usually have to be based on the surrogate's assessment
of the prospective subject's best interests. However, as explained in Part I,
participating in a study is often not the best choice from the perspective of an
individual's medical interests. Even studies that offer a prospect of direct medical
benefit involve additional risks not present when patients undergo individualized
medical treatment. 130 There are also risks associated with the fact that the experimental
intervention has never been proven to work. '31 Moreover, even when the experimental
intervention offered in a study looks especially promising as compared to existing
therapeutic options, it will often be possible to obtain that intervention outside of
research, either by finding a doctor willing to prescribe an approved drug off-label or
seeking a compassionate use exemption to permit the non-research use of an
unapproved drug. ' 32 If the potential direct benefits of a study can be obtained without
assuming the added risks of research, it is difficult to see how exposing an
incapacitated person to those risks can be justified under a best interests analysis.
That is not to say that there are no situations in which enrolling in a clinical trial can
genuinely be said to represent the best therapeutic option for a particular patient.
Patients suffering from serious conditions for which no effective treatments exist, or
patients who have tried all available treatments and failed to respond, may welcome
the opportunity to try an unproven intervention despite the uncertain benefits. Under
such circumstances, if a promising experimental intervention exists that is not available
outside of a clinical trial, it might be in the best interests of the patient to pursue it,
despite the risks and uncertainty involved. However, situations in which enrolling in a
study are the best therapeutic option for a patient are the exception, not the norm.
A possible response to the foregoing analysis is that it rests on an overly exacting
interpretation of the meaning of "best interests." Norman Cantor, for example, rejects
"[tihe typical understanding... that a best-interests judgment requires maximizing the
helpless ward's interest or determining 'the highest benefit . . . among available
options."' 33 Instead, he argues, in some cases the decision need only be "reasonably
consistent with the interests of the disabled person," while in other cases, all that is
required is that "the determination not be abusive in the sense of subjecting the
dependent person to serious risk of harm. ' ' 34 Under such a framework it might be
acceptable for a surrogate to enroll an incapacitated person in research as long as the
study offers a reasonable possibility of providing some direct medical benefits, the
risks are not substantially greater than pursuing individualized treatment outside of the
study, and other methods of treating the patient's condition would involve additional
costs or burdens that the surrogate is unwilling to undertake.1
35
130. See supra text accompanying notes 34-40.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 41-45.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 46-50.
133. NORMAN L. CANTOR, MAKING MEDICAL DEcIsIONs FOR THE PROFOUNDLY MENTALLY
DISABLED 127 (2005).
134. Id. at 127-28.
135. See id.
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However, the cases Cantor cites do not demonstrate that courts are willing to
interpret the "best interests" standard flexibly; rather, they are situations in which the
best interests standard does not apply. Specifically, all of the cases involve parents
making medical decisions for their minor children. As discussed below, 136 parents
have a constitutional and common-law right to raise their children without state
interference, as long as they do not engage in conduct that constitutes abuse or
neglect. 137 Thus, it is the abuse and neglect laws that define the outer limits of parents'
authority to make decisions for their minor children, not the wishes/best interests
standards that govern surrogate decisions about medical treatment for incapacitated
adults.
In addition, it is important to remember that the reason participating in research
sometimes appears to be in an individual's best interests is that the optimal
alternative-obtaining individualized medical attention from a treating physician-
may be practically unavailable to persons without adequate access to health care. In
other words, the "benefit" of being a research subject depends to a large extent on the
fact that we have an inequitable health care system in which many people face
significant financial and other barriers to obtaining basic medical care. As a matter of
public policy, it is hypocritical to claim that a system that forces surrogates to rely on
research as the only effective means of obtaining medical attention can be justified by
a commitment to promoting the "best interests" of incapacitated persons. 1
38
Of course, in our health care system as it exists today, it is hard to fault a surrogate
for wanting to enroll an incapacitated person in a study if doing so is the only practical
way of obtaining access to health care. However, even under an expansive
interpretation of the best interests standard, it would be difficult to justify enrolling an
incapacitated person in research when other alternatives would be significantly less
risky or offer significantly greater benefits. And no matter how far the concept of best
interests is stretched, it would still leave out the entire category of no-direct-benefit
studies. While such studies may indirectly contribute to improved treatments in the
future, they have no therapeutic justification from the perspective of the subjects' own
136. See infra text accompanying notes 176-79.
137. As the Supreme Court has observed,
the best interests of the child is not the legal standard that governs parents' or
guardians' exercise of their custody: So long as certain minimum requirements of
child care are met, the interests of the child may be subordinated to the interests of
other children, or indeed even to the interests of the parents or guardians
themselves.
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304 (1993).
138. The use of best interests rhetoric to justify decisions that are actually based on other
factors is not limited to decisions about medical research. In family law, for example, scholars
have recognized that appeals to the "best interests of the child" mask the fact that decisions
about children's welfare are often made on an arbitrary basis. Robert Mnookin has suggested
that instead of claiming that custody decisions are based on the child's best interests, "[w]e
would more frankly acknowledge both our ignorance and the presumed equality of the natural
parents were we to flip a coin." Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial
Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 289 (1975).
However, there is a difference between using best interests language when all of the options are
equally acceptable, as in the custody example, and using it when a surrogate is making decisions
that are inconsistent with the incapacitated person's welfare.
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medical interests. Accordingly, if surrogate decisions about medical research must
conform to the wishes/best interests framework applicable to ordinary medical
treatment, the only persons who could be enrolled in no-direct-benefit studies would be
those whose wishes to enroll in this type of research were known. For the reasons
discussed above, it is unlikely that there will be many persons who have left reliable
evidence of their desire to be exposed to risks without any possibility of receiving
direct medical benefits. Moreover, for conditions associated with lifelong capacity
impairments, evidence of the prospective subjects' wishes will never exist.
2. The Justification for Deferring to Surrogates
A second problem with the analogy to medical treatment is that, even in the
treatment context, the law's willingness to defer to surrogates' assessment of patients'
wishes and best interests is subject to significant limitations. Surrogates are not free to
make any decision they want as long as they claim that they are promoting the
incapacitated person's wishes or best interests. Instead, surrogates have the discretion
to interpret the incapacitated person's wishes and best interests only within a relatively
narrow range of permissible choices. These limitations are grounded in the underlying
justification for surrogate decision making-a justification that does not apply to most
decisions about medical research.
At the outset, it is important to distinguish between two different types of surrogate
decision makers-those chosen by the patient while competent (that is, decision
makers appointed via health care proxies) and those empowered to make decisions for
the patient by operation of law. Proxy decision makers (often called "health care
agents") generally have the authority to make any health care decision for an
incapacitated patient that the patient would have been permitted to make if she retained
decision-making capacity. 139 While the agent's decisions must be consistent with the
wishes or best interests of the incapacitated person, health care proxy statutes
effectively put the burden on those challenging the agent's decision to show that the
agent did not apply those standards accurately.
Thus, it is fair to say that this first category of decision makers enjoys considerable
discretion in interpreting the wishes and best interests of the incapacitated person. This
discretion is justified by the fact that the patient voluntarily gave the agent unrestricted
authority to make decisions on her behalf. However, health care proxy statutes
authorize agents to make decisions about medical treatment, not research. It would be
possible, of course, to amend those laws so that individuals could also delegate the
authority to make decisions about research, and to give "research agents" the same
degree of deference that health care agents currently enjoy. 140 The reality, however, is
139. See Steven I. Friedland, The Health Care Proxy and the Narrative of Death, 10 J.L. &
HEALTH 95, 135 (1995/1996).
140. In fact, both NYSAWG and the Maryland commission recommended that states enact
legislation authorizing the appointment of "research agents." See NYSAWG REPORT, supra note
111, at 25; MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY S.B. BILL 307 (1999), at § 20.701(W). Similarly,
NBAC proposed "an amendment to the Common Rule that would define the term 'legally
authorized representative' to include those who, under the law of the state where the research is
conducted, may serve as proxy decision makers for clinical care." NBAC REPORT, supra note
57, at 63. However, under all of these proposals, agents would have the authority to consent to
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that most people do not have health care proxies,a14 and even fewer people are likely to
be interested in authorizing agents to make decisions about medical research. People
simply do not like to think about the possibility of losing capacity, and those who make
plans for such a possibility generally do not have decisions about research participation
at the forefront of their minds.
The more important category of decision makers, therefore, are persons whose
decision-making authority exists by operation of law, whether as a result of a
guardianship proceeding or pursuant to statutes or case law authorizing surrogate
consent. The authority of decision makers in this second category is far more
circumscribed than that of decision makers appointed by the patient. For example, in
most states, surrogates not appointed by the patient are permitted to refuse life-
sustaining treatment only if the patient meets specific medical criteria, such as being
terminally ill or permanently unconscious.1 42 In some states, there must also be
medical evidence that the burdens of continued treatment would outweigh the benefits
for the patient. 143 In many jurisdictions, certain sensitive medical decisions cannot be
made by surrogates without judicial authorization, including decisions about
electroconvulsive therapy, abortion, or sterilization. 144
In general, the areas where surrogates are given the greatest deference are those in
which no single decision can be considered objectively reasonable in all
circumstances. For example, the risks and benefits of keeping a debilitated, terminally
ill patient on a ventilator or feeding tube are often difficult to determine; their
assessment depends as much on the patient's values and preferences as on objective
medical facts. 145 The rationale for deferring to surrogates in these situations is that
someone with a personal connection to the patient is most likely to be able to make the
decision that is best for the patient in light of her individual characteristics.
146
The situation is different when there is less uncertainty about what would constitute
an objectively reasonable decision. For example, if an otherwise healthy woman
experiences excessive bleeding following childbirth and requires a transfusion, it is
unlikely that a surrogate would be permitted to refuse the transfusion on the woman's
behalf in the absence of very strong evidence that the woman, if competent, would
have refused the transfusion herself. 147 Unlike a decision about providing a ventilator
high-risk, no-direct-benefit research only if the incapacitated person had expressly indicated her
willingness to participate in such research while competent. See NYSAWG REPORT, supra note
111, at 25, 32-33; MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY S.B. BILL 307 (1999), at § 20.745(A)(1)(I);
NBAC REPORT, supra note 57, at 63.
141. See Bernard Lo & Robert Steinbrook, Resuscitating Advance Directives, 164 ARCHIvEs
INTERNAL MED. 1501 (2004).
142. See ABA COMMISSION, SURROGATE CONSENT, supra note 94.
143. E.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232 (1985).
144. E.g., D.C. CODE § 21-2211 (2001).
145. Norman L. Cantor, D~jh Vu All Over Again: The False Dichotomy Between Sanctity of
Life and Quality of Life, 35 STETSON L. REv. 81, 85 (2005) (noting that patients must rely on
"personal values and preferences" to decide "whether the prospective preservable state would be
so intolerably painful or degrading as to make treatment unwanted").
146. See In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 444-45 (1987).
147. The most likely reason a surrogate would seek to do this would be for religious reasons.
See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Objections in Conscience to Medical Procedures: Does Religion
Make a Difference?, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 799, 803 (2006) (noting that Jehovah's Witnesses
"believe that God's will is that they not accept transfers of blood").
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or feeding tube to a terminally ill patient, in the case of the transfusion, the objectively
reasonable decision is clear: the blood should be provided because it will save an
otherwise healthy patient's life. State surrogacy statutes recognize this distinction by
limiting surrogates' authority to refuse life-sustaining treatment to situations, such as
terminal illness, where the appropriateness of providing treatment is a matter about
which reasonable people can disagree.14
8
These limitations reveal an important fact about the purpose of surrogate decision
making. While competent persons have broad authority to refuse medical treatment,
even when doing so appears to be objectively unreasonable, 149 surrogates are generally
limited to making choices among reasonable options in situations where identifying the
most appropriate option for the patient requires value judgments about which
reasonable people can differ.150 As in the obstetric example, a surrogate's
unsubstantiated claims about what the patient would have wanted are insufficient to
justify decisions that are clearly inconsistent with the patient's best interests. Instead,
such decisions will be authorized only if there is specific evidence of the patient's own
prior decision. '51 In other words, the reason for deferring to surrogates is not to
promote the patient's right to engage in behavior that is clearly contrary to an objective
assessment of her welfare. Instead, even when surrogates base decisions on the
"wishes" of the incapacitated person, the best interests standard lurks in the
background, limiting the range of options from which surrogates may choose.' 
52
Cases involving the use of incapacitated persons as live organ donors support this
interpretation. Every court that has addressed the issue has rejected efforts to use
148. See supra text accompanying notes 145-46.
149. E.g., Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77 (N.Y. 1990) (upholding the right of a
Jehovah's Witness patient to refuse a life-saving blood transfusion).
150. See generally Rosamond Rhodes & Ian R. Holzman, The Not Unreasonable Standard
for Assessment ofSurrogates and Surrogate Decisions, 25 THEORETCAL MED. & BIoETHICS 367
(2004) (arguing that physicians should not accede to surrogates' unreasonable decisions).
151. Requiring specific evidence of the patient's prior decision is not simply a form of
surrogate decision making with a higher evidentiary standard; it is an entirely different
approach. With surrogate decision making, the surrogate is not required to make any particular
decision; she has the discretion to interpret the patient's wishes and best interests in light of the
circumstances. When there is specific evidence of the patient's prior decision, by contrast, the
surrogate no longer has any discretion; the prior evidence is controlling, and the surrogate has
no more authority than anyone else to override what the patient has decided. This distinction is
recognized in most states' surrogacy statutes, which provide that surrogates may not override
instructions the patient set forth in a living will. E.g., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/15 (2007).
152. Indeed, it is often the case that policies ostensibly motivated by respect for individual
autonomy are constrained by societal assumptions about what is objectively reasonable. For
example, proponents of physician-assisted suicide frequently ground their arguments in claims
about individuals' autonomous right to make life-and-death decisions, but at the same time,
most of them emphasize that they would legalize assisted suicide only for terminally ill patients.
See generally Charles H. Baron, Clyde Bergstresser, Dan W. Brock, Garrick F. Cole, Nancy S.
Dorfman, Judith A. Johnson, Lowell E. Schnipper, James Vorenberg & Sidney H. Wanzer, A
Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate Physician-Assisted Suicide, 33 HARv. J. ON LE Is. 1
(1996). Thus, they are not prepared to recognize all autonomous decisions to commit suicide;
their support is limited to decisions that fall within parameters they consider to be objectively
reasonable.
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incapacitated persons as organ donors in the absence of evidence that the donation
would be in the best interests of the incapacitated person-for example, by saving the
life of a close relative on whom the incapacitated person depends. 153 Without an
accompanying benefit to the incapacitated person, the desire to benefit others-even to
save another person's life-does not justify performing an invasive procedure on a
person without his or her consent.154
The reason for these constraints on the scope of surrogates' authority is that
surrogate decision making is not a risk-free endeavor. Numerous studies have shown
that even close relatives and friends often do a poor job of predicting the type of
treatments their loved ones would want in hypothetical medical scenarios,' 55 thus
undermining the reliability of surrogates' assessments of the wishes of incapacitated
patients. In addition, there is always a danger that giving surrogates discretion will
allow them to consider factors other than the patient's wishes and best interests-for
example, the surrogate's own interest in saving money on health care costs-or that
surrogates will be motivated by unconscious biases against persons who are elderly or
disabled. 1
56
We allow surrogates to make decisions for incapacitated patients despite these
inherent dangers because relying on surrogates is the least problematic alternative
when decisions must be made for incapacitated patients and no single solution is
clearly objectively preferable. For many years, it was hoped that people could be
encouraged to formalize their wishes about medical treatment in a "living will," but
despite decades of effort, 157 the percentage of the population with living wills remains
small. 158 Moreover, physicians and bioethicists are increasingly recognizing that living
153. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Ky. 1969) (finding that the donation would be
beneficial to the incapacitated person because he "was greatly dependent upon [his brother],
emotionally and psychologically, and that his well-being would be jeopardized more severely
by the loss of his brother than by the removal of a kidney"). See generally CANTOR, supra note
133, at 75-78.
154. Similar constraints apply outside the area of medical decision making. For example,
courts have held that guardians may not use the assets of their wards to make charitable
contributions unless the ward "manifested [a] commitment to such charity" before losing
capacity or the donation would be in the incapacitated person's best interests. In re: Ema Marx
Probate Court, 18 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 35, 40-41 (2004).
155. See generally David I. Shalowitz, Elizabeth Garrett-Mayer & David Wendler, 166
ARCHIvEs INTERNAL MED. 493 (2006).
156. CANTOR, supra note 133, at 37 (noting that some advocates for people with disabilities
"fear substituted judgment as a cover for exploitation based on prejudice and stereotyped views
of the quality of life experienced by the profoundly disabled").
157. One such effort is the federal Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA), which requires
health care facilities to ask patients upon admission if they have advance directives, to
document the existence of any such directives in the patient's record, and to provide notice to
patients without advance directives of their rights to create advance directives and the facility's
policies with respect to such directives. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc, 1396a (2000 & Supp. IV
2004). The PSDA appears to have had little impact. Carl E. Schneider & Lee E. Teitelbaum,
Life's Golden Tree: Empirical Scholarship and American Law, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 53, 95
(2006).
158. Will Lester, Poll: More Americans Have Living Wills, ASSOctATED PRESS, Jan. 5,2006
(reporting that twenty-nine percent of the population claims to have a living will).
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wills have significant limitations. For example, they typically contain broad
pronouncements about the patient's wishes that are insufficiently flexible to deal with
the ambiguities of real clinical decisions.159 In addition, living wills are based on
people's predictions about how they will react to hypothetical situations that may occur
far in the future. Research has shown that people often respond to real-world medical
situations very differently than they might have anticipated from the standpoint of
good health. 160
Other approaches to making treatment decisions for incapacitated patients also have
serious limitations. Theoretically, the law could require judicial approval of all medical
decisions for incapacitated patients. However, in addition to the expense and delay
such an approach would entail, it is doubtful that judicial review would change the
outcome of decisions when no one is disputing the appropriateness of what the
surrogate wants to do. Requiring all potentially life-prolonging treatment to be
provided in the absence of clear and convincing evidence of the patient's wish to the
contrary, an approach used in a few states, 161 ignores the fact that most people do not
discuss their wishes about medical treatment with the level of specificity that the clear
and convincing evidence standard demands. As a result, this approach forces many
people to receive burdensome interventions that they almost certainly would have
refused if they had been competent to do so. 
1 62
In summary, the reason the law defers to surrogates in the context of medical
treatment is that there are situations in which somebody must exercise individualized
judgment to determine what treatments are appropriate for an incapacitated patient, and
relying on surrogate decision makers is the least worst alternative. These
159. See, e.g., JOSEPH J. FINS, A PALLIATIVE ETHIC OF-CARE: CLINICAL WISDOM AT LIFE'S
END 125 (2006) (arguing that "[1]iving wills have limited utility in the clinical context" because
they may be "too vague," "ambiguous," or "too specific").
160. Rebecca Dresser, Precommitment: A Misguided Strategy for Securing Death with
Dignity, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1823, 1823 (2003) (citing the difficulty of predicting future treatment
preferences as a reason that advance directives are an "inferior strategy for making end-of-life
decisions"). See generally Terri R. Fried, Amy L. Byers, Williams T. Gallo, Peter H. Van Ness,
Virginia R. Towle, John R. O'Leary & Joel A. Dubin, Prospective Study of Health Status
Preferences and Changes in Preferences Over Time in Older Adults, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 890 (2006); Nina A. Kohn & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Designating Health Care Decision-
Makers for Patients Without Advance Directives: A Psychological Critique,
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1008494 (showing that individuals often do
a poor job of predicting their future treatment preferences).
161. E.g., In re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988) (holding that the
hospital was authorized to insert a feeding tube into the incapacitated patient in the absence of
clear and convincing evidence that the patient's wishes were otherwise).
162. Norman L. Cantor, Discarding Substituted Judgment and Best Interests: Toward a
Constructive Preference Standardfor Dying, Previously Competent Patients Without Advance
Instructions, 48 RuTGERs L. REV. 1193, 1245 (1996) (arguing that requiring evidence of the
patient's desire to refuse life-sustaining treatment ignores the fact that "the vast majority of
competent people do not wish to be preserved in a demented, gravely debilitated, and helpless
state"); see also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 316 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that requiring clear and convincing evidence of the patient's prior decision
to refuse life-sustaining treatment imposes a "markedly asymmetrical evidentiary burden" that
undermines the goal of promoting the patient's autonomy).
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considerations do not apply to most decisions about medical research. Rather, research
is generally an optional activity that is primarily designed to benefit future patients, not
the subjects in the study. It is true that, in some situations, participating in certain types
of direct-benefit studies may be in the best interests of someone without viable medical
alternatives, and in those cases, deference to surrogate decision makers can be justified
by the same principles that justify deference to surrogate decisions about medical
treatment. However, the rationale for deferring to surrogates would not apply to most
other types of research, including all studies not involving a prospect of direct benefit
to the subjects. For those studies, if the principles governing treatment decisions are
accurately applied, surrogate consent would have to be based on very clear evidence of
the incapacitated person's prior decision to participate in research of that nature. 163 For
the reasons explained above, 164 this type of evidence will rarely be available.
B. Other Proposed Justifications
A few justifications for research with decisionally impaired subjects that do not rely
on the standards applicable to decisions about medical treatment have been discussed
in academic literature. These justifications can be divided into two groups. The first,
grounded in an individual rights perspective, seeks to show that allowing surrogate
consent to research is consistent with the principle of individual autonomy. The second
rejects individual autonomy as the governing paradigm and instead relies on
communitarian theories about family relationships or individuals' obligations to
society.
For those seeking to reconcile surrogate consent to research with individual
autonomy, the challenge is to show that enrolling an incapacitated person in research
without clear evidence of her wishes respects her right to make her own decisions
about the use of her body. One way to do this is to draw on an argument sometimes
made to support the use of incapacitated persons as organ donors-the theory of
"presumed altruism." This approach presumes that in the absence of evidence to the
163. The commission reports discussed in Part H did not recognize this distinction. The
NBAC report said nothing about the level of evidence of the incapacitated person's wishes that
would be required in any type of study. The NYSAWG would have required heightened
evidence of the incapacitated person's wishes only in no-direct-benefit studies involving more
than a minor increase over minimal risk. For all other studies, surrogates could rely on "any
relevant information" suggesting that "the research is in accordance with the individual's
wishes." NYSAWG REPORT, supra note 111, at 26-27. The report's list of "relevant
information" is quite broad, including, for example, "statements by the individual about the
effect of research participation on the individual's family or on others who have the same
condition." Id. at 27. Nothing in the report suggests that surrogates would have to produce
specific evidence to support their claims about the incapacitated person's wishes. In contrast to
the NYSAWG, the Maryland group would have applied a heightened evidentiary standard to all
more-than-minimal-risk no-direct-benefit studies. See Hoffmann & Schwartz, supra note 113, at
144 (noting that the group's proposal would have required health care agents to have "direct and
explicit evidence of the individual's wish to participate, as documented in accordance with
standards and procedures set by the IRB"). However, the heightened evidentiary standard would
not have applied to any studies involving a prospective of direct benefits, regardless of the risk
level.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 125-29.
2008]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
contrary, all people would altruistically consent to accepting moderate risks for the
benefit of others. 165 If this presumption is correct, enrolling an incapacitated person in
research-even in a no-direct-benefit study-would be fully consistent with respect for
autonomy, as it would simply be promoting the incapacitated person's probable
preferences. In fact, some commentators argue that it is disrespectful of incapacitated
persons to deny them the opportunity to act altruistically because doing so treats them
"as less than fully human."' 66
The problem with this approach is that one of the main reasons that altruism is
considered commendable is that it is not something we normally expect of people.
Instead, altruism is generally regarded as a supererogatory activity-that is,
commendable behavior that goes above and beyond what is normally expected in our
society. 167 In the absence of evidence of an incapacitated person's wishes, we should
not presume that she would engage in activities that are generally considered
extraordinary. Instead, the default assumption should be that she would comply with
social expectations but not necessarily exceed them-in other words, that she would
act like the law's hypothetical "reasonable person." Otherwise, we would be subjecting
incapacitated people to higher expectations than those to which the rest of us are held.
Moreover, it is far from clear that most people would, in fact, altruistically assume
the risks of research for the benefit of other people. Most competent people have never
volunteered to be research subjects; in fact, interest in participating in clinical trials
among United States residents has been declining for the past decade, forcing -
researchers to look overseas to attract a sufficient number of subjects. 168 Therefore, the
presumption that incapacitated people would probably consent to be research subjects
rests on a weak empirical foundation.
Rather than attempting to reconcile surrogate consent to research with respect for
individual autonomy, other approaches rely on theories that de-emphasize autonomy in
favor of communitarian values. In general, communitarians reject liberalism's focus on
"the individual as a bounded, integrated whole that is separate from other
individuals," 169 and instead emphasize that individuals "are partly defined by the
communities [they] inhabit."' 70 As a result, they argue, laws and policies should seek
to strengthen communities and their internal values, rather than treating individual
autonomy as inherently superior to all other goods.' 7'
165. But cf CANTOR, supra note 133, at 175 (pointing out that lifelong incapacitated persons
are unable to develop personal values concerning altruism). See generally Michael T. Morley,
Note, Proxy Consent to Organ Donation by Incompetents, 111 YALE L.J. 1215 (2002).
166. Morley, supra note 165, at 1242; see also In re Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Wis.
1975) (Day, J., dissenting) (arguing that preventing incapacitated persons from donating their
kidneys "condemn[s] the incompetent to be always a receiver, a taker, but never a giver").
167. See, e.g., David Orentlicher, Making Research a Requirement of Treatment: Why We
Should Sometimes Let Doctors Pressure Patients to Participate in Research, HASTINGS CTR.
REP., Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 24.
168. See Research Notes-Clinical Trials: Efforts to Increase Participation Examined, AM.
HEALTH LINE, June 22, 2006.
169. Gaia Bernstein, Accommodating Technological Innovation: Identity, Genetic Testing,
and the Internet, 57 VAND. L. REv. 965, 977 (2004).
170. Michael J. Sandel, Introduction to LIBERALISM AND ITS CRTcs 1, 6 (Michael J. Sandel
ed., 1984).
171. See WILL KYMLICKA, MuLTicuLTuRAL CmzENsHw: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY
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Drawing on this communitarian framework, some commentators argue that the
reason society should defer to surrogates' decisions about medical research is that
surrogates are typically close relatives of the incapacitated person, and society has an
interest in promoting the value of "family autonomy." Those who take this position
emphasize the trust society places in families, the privacy inherent in family life, and
the self-imposed social obligations that certain families assume. 172 Under this
approach, deference to surrogates is appropriate not because surrogates will necessarily
know the incapacitated person's wishes, but because it respects families' rights to
establish and enforce their own values, including the value of self-sacrifice.
However, even accepting that intra-familial decisions are entitled to some level of
deference, it is not clear why that deference should extend to decisions to enroll an
incapacitated family member in medical research. Communitarian theory does not
demand deference to any decisions that are made within close-knit communities.
Rather, the goal of deferring to communities' decisions is to strengthen "the purposes
and ends characteristic of those communities." 173 While it may sometimes be the case
that a surrogate's decision to enroll an incapacitated family member in research stems
from the family's "characteristic" willingness to expose themselves to risks for the
benefit of others, there is no reason to assume that this will necessarily be true. Under a
system that authorizes surrogate consent to research, families would be free to expose
their incapacitated relatives to risks that no one else in the family would ever
voluntarily accept. As a practical matter, there would be no way to determine whether
a decision to enroll an incapacitated relative in a no-direct-benefit study reflects a
family's shared commitment to the value of self-sacrifice, or whether the family's
belief in self-sacrifice extends only to those family members who cannot make
decisions for themselves.
Moreover, appeals to family autonomy as a justification for surrogate decision
making rest on the questionable assumption that all families are necessarily cohesive
"communities." Some incapacitated persons, if able to state their preferences, would
probably say that they reject many of the values that are important to their relatives. In
a liberal society, it is inappropriate to force someone to adhere to a community's self-
proclaimed values unless the individual has voluntarily agreed that those values should
bind her. 174 This is why we do not allow Jehovah's Witness families to refuse blood
transfusions on behalf of incapacitated relatives without clear evidence that the person
in need of the transfusion embraced the religious convictions held by the rest of the
RIGHTS 91 (1995) (explaining that some communitarian theories call for the state to "reinforce
people's allegiances" to ends that are "constitutive of people's identity").
172. See generally Kathleen Cranley Glass& Marc Speyer-Ofenberg, Incompetent Persons
as Research Subjects and the Ethics of Minimal Risk, 5 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTCARE ETHicS
362, 368-69 (1996).
173. Sandel, supra note 170 (emphasis added); see also Michael J. Sandel, Justice and the
Good, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 159, 167 (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984) ("For a society to
be a community in this strong sense, community must be constitutive of the shared self-
understandings of the participants and embodied in their institutional arrangements, not simply
an attribute of certain of the participants' plans of life.").
174. See KYMLiCKA, supra note 171, at 152 ("Liberals are committed to supporting the right
of individuals to decide for themselves which aspects of their cultural heritage are worth passing
on.").
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family. 175 The fact that an individual is related to people who hold particular values
does not mean that the individual necessarily embraces those values herself.
'Admittedly, there is one context in which the law lets families impose their values
on persons incapable of consenting-the area of parental decision making for'minor
children. For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 176 the Supreme Court held that Amish
parents had the right to take their children out of school after the eighth grade, despite
a state law requiring children to attend school until age sixteen, in order to promote
Amish beliefs in the importance of remaining "aloof from the world." 177 The Court
emphasized the importance of protecting the parents' ability to enforce their
community's values without demanding proof that the children themselves embraced
those values.' 78 Yoder is not an isolated decision. As noted above, the law generally
gives parents broad leeway in making decisions for their minor children--even
decisions that deviate from widely-held social values-as long as the parents'
decisions do not rise to the level of abuse or neglect. 179
However, there are important differences between parental decisions for minor
children and surrogate decisions on behalf of incapacitated adults. First, cases
protecting the parents' right to make decisions without undue state interference are
grounded in large part on the unique role that parents play in raising their children. For
example, in Yoder, the Court emphasized the "values of parental direction of the
religious upbringing and education of their children in their early and formative
years."180 Similarly, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court emphasized the parents'
role in "nurtur[ing]" a child and "direct[ing] his destiny."181 Raising a child involves
unique rights and responsibilities not applicable to other types of intra-familial
relationships. Most importantly, a parent of a minor child is expected to instill values
and behavior that will help the child develop into a responsible person. The principle
of parental autonomy protects parents' right to shape their children's character
consistent with the parents' own values and preferences, which arguably includes the
right to teach the value of altruism by enrolling their children in research. 182 This
justification does not apply to decisions by family members on behalf of incapacitated
adults. For example, an adult child caring for a parent with Alzheimer's has neither the
right nor the ability to control the parent's moral development. When family members
are acting as caretakers rather than child-raisers, the argument for deference is
considerably weaker. 183
175. E.g., In re Hughes, 611 A.2d 1148 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992); In re Dorone, 534
A.2d 452 (Pa. 1987).
176. 406 U.S. 205,234 (1972).
177. Id. at 210.
178. See id. at 242 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (criticizing the majority for "assum[ing]
an identity of interest between parent and child").
179. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
180. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213-14.
181. 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
182. Randall Baldwin Clark, Speed, Safety, and Dignity: Pediatric Pharmaceutical
Development in an Age of Optimism, 9 U. Cu. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 28 (2002) (arguing that
enrolling children in no-direct-benefit research could be "yet another context in which children
might develop the charitable instincts that parents want them to possess").
183. This distinction raises a difficult question: what standard should apply to parents
making decisions about research for minor children with mental impairments who will never
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Moreover, the general assumptions we have about the attitudes of parents toward
their minor children are not necessarily applicable to other types of family
relationships. Parents are presumed to be motivated by the child's best interests,'84 a
presumption that is justified not just because they love their children but also because
protecting one's offspring is a basic biological imperative.185 In general, parents see
their children as their legacy and contribution to the future. The same cannot be said
for an adult child caring for an aging parent, a parent caring for a never-competent
adult child, or one spouse caring for another. Moreover, family caregivers often
"endure negative psychological and emotional costs because of compromised
relationships, sacrifices of one's own family and career, and social isolation."'186 In
some instances, these burdens can lead to "the development of negative feelings
toward the care recipient,"' 187 which should make us wary about presuming that family
surrogates will always be motivated by incapacitated persons' well-being. 1
88
Rather than attempting to justify surrogate decision making by relying on an open-
ended principle of family autonomy, another group of communitarian-inspired
commentators shifts the focus to claims about incapacitated persons' social
responsibilities. Norman Cantor, the most articulate proponent of this position, argues
that research with incapacitated subjects can be justified by "a concept of justice or
fairness that is associated with mutual interdependence within communities."' 189 He
argues that principles of social justice permit surrogates to "impose some measure of
sacrifice" on incapacitated persons "in return for the social or family child-rearing
benefits being conferred on that person,"190 including benefits such as "decent food,
shelter, and care."' 19 In response to the concern that "[t]he use of a social-justice
rationale raises a specter of the past abusive exploitation of disabled populations,"192
Cantor emphasizes the difference between government-imposed sacrifices and
develop the capacity to make their own decisions? Such parents cannot justify exposing the
child to risk by appealing to the educational aspects of research participation. In these cases it
may be appropriate to require the parents' decisions to conform to whatever limitations apply to
surrogate decision making for adult incapacitated subjects.
184. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,66 (2000).
185. E.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REv. 2401,
2433-34 (1995).
186. Stefan Staicovici, Respite Care for All Family Caregivers: The Lifespan Respite Care
Act, 20 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 243, 251 (2003).
187. Id.
188. As Rebecca Dresser points out:
Proxies and surrogates may see a dementia patient's research participation as a
vehicle to secure services or other benefits that ease caregiving responsibilities.
Biological relatives may seek to enroll a family member in studies that offer the
promise of reducing their own risks of future disease affliction. In empirical
studies, some representatives said they would be willing to enroll a decisionally
incapable relative in research even if they thought the relative would refuse
participation if capable. Some representatives also said they would enroll a
relative in a study that the representatives would refuse for themselves.
Rebecca Dresser, Dementia Research: Ethics and Policyfor the Twenty-First Century, 35 GA.
L. REv. 661, 675-76 (2001).
189. CANTOR, supra note 133, at 186.
190. Id. at 187.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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sacrifices accepted by the incapacitated person's close relatives. 93 He also argues that
the notion of "intrinsic human dignity" 194 places objective limits on the extent to which
surrogates can "extract sacrifices" from incapacitated persons. 95 For example, he
would limit surrogate consent to studies involving only minimal risk or, perhaps,
studies involving a "minor increase"'1 over minimal risk; he would require that
researchers demonstrate the "absolute necessity of using" incapacitated persons; 197 and
he maintains that incapacitated persons' objections to research should always be
honored. 1
98
Yet, even with Cantor's proposed limitations, there are dangers in relying on claims
about incapacitated persons' obligations to society as a justification for authorizing
surrogate consent to research. The argument that incapacitated persons have an
obligation to "pay back" for the receipt of social benefits implies that the care they
receive is contingent-that is, a transfer of resources that must be reimbursed rather
than the expression of an unconditional social obligation. Moreover, while Cantor is
careful to emphasize that he is not advocating government compulsion, a focus on
duties sends the message that surrogates who withhold consent are acting
inappropriately. Surrogates may therefore feel greater pressure to consent to studies
even if they are not formally compelled.
Ultimately, neither individualistic nor communitarian theories can adequately
explain why surrogates should be permitted to enroll incapacitated persons in research.
Individualistic arguments depend on fictions about incapacitated persons' presumed
preferences that are neither credible nor consistent with the expectations we have for
the rest of society. Communitarian theories about family autonomy rest on the
questionable assumption that surrogate consent will be motivated by a shared familial
commitment to the value of self-sacrifice, as well as the assumption that incapacitated
persons necessarily share the values of their families. Finally, arguments that appeal to
incapacitated persons' social obligations convey a message that threatens to undermine
society's commitment to protecting the most vulnerable.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
One response to the difficulty of justifying surrogate consent to research is to
conclude that research with incapacitated persons should simply be prohibited. This
conclusion cannot be dismissed out of hand. Past abuses of human subjects in research
should certainly give us pause about permitting vulnerable individuals to be enrolled in
studies without their own authorization, especially studies that involve risks without
the prospect of direct benefits. The increasing commercialization of research, coupled
with the corresponding rise in financial conflicts of interest, heightens the concern that
researchers will insufficiently look out for the best interests of subjects. 199 Moreover,
193. Id. at 188.
194. Id. at 191.
195. Id. at 192-93.
196. Id. at 194.
197. Id. at 198.
198. See id. at 199.
199. Jesse A. Goldner, Dealing with Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: IRB
Oversight as the Next Best Solution to the Abolitionist Approach, 28 J.L. MED. & ETmcs 379,
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the oversight system for research has insufficient resources to carry out its
responsibilities effectively, 2°° thus creating the risk that researchers who push their
ethical boundaries will not be identified or controlled.
Nonetheless, prohibiting research with incapacitated subjects, or limiting such
research to the small number of persons who have left clear and convincing evidence
of their desire to participate, is not the solution. The flaw with restrictive policies is
that by focusing entirely on the risks associated with being a research subject, they
ignore incapacitated persons' interest in receiving the benefits of improved medical
treatments. From a public policy perspective, it makes no sense to assume that any
burdens on the interests of research subjects are inherently improper, regardless of the
level of those burdens, without taking into account the harm of excluding an entire
population from the potential benefits of scientific advances.
This Part therefore proposes an analytical framework that recognizes incapacitated
persons' dual interests in research-their interest in being protected from the risks of
being involuntary research subjects, as well as their interest in reaping the benefits of
studies that depend on the permissibility of surrogate consent. It begins by explaining
the theory behind the framework and the implications of that theory for the types of
studies for which surrogate consent should be permitted. It then considers how the
proposed justification affects the way we conceptualize the surrogate's role.
A. Two Levels of Best Interests: Broadening the Risk-Benefit Assessment Beyond
the Level of the Individual Study
As discussed in the previous Parts, a common theme to all approaches to surrogate
consent is that to the extent they are concerned with the best interests of incapacitated
persons, their focus is on the risks and benefits those persons face from being subjects
in particular studies. This narrow focus ignores the fact that incapacitated people are
affected not only by the studies in which they are the subjects, but also by studies in
which other incapacitated people are subjects, given that they may benefit from
treatments resulting from studies in which they do not personally participate. In light of
this fact, incapacitated people face risks and benefits no matter how society's overall
surrogate consent policy is structured. The more restrictive the policy, the more it
protects individuals from being enrolled in studies with unfavorable risk-benefit
profiles, but the less opportunity those persons have to benefit from studies in which
they do not personally participate. The more permissive the policy, the more likely
individuals will reap the benefits of research conducted with other incapacitated
people, but the greater risk they face of being enrolled in studies that do not further
their immediate medical interests and expose them to potential harm.
As a result, determining the best interests of incapacitated persons requires two
different levels of risk-benefit analysis. First, we must identify the risks and benefits
associated with enrolling in particular studies to determine whether enrolling in those
studies will promote the best interests of the individual subjects. Second, we must step
back from the particular study and evaluate the risks and benefits to incapacitated
people from a broader, systemic perspective. Here, the relevant question is whether it
is better or worse for incapacitated people to be governed by a policy that permits
380 (2000).
200. Carl H. Coleman, Rationalizing Risk Assessment in Human Subject Research, 46 ARpz.
L. REv. 1, 3 (2004).
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surrogates to consent to studies like the one under consideration. Although the two
questions are related, they need not yield identical answers. In some cases, even if it is
not in an individual's best interests to be enrolled in a particular study, given the
balance between the study's risks and the expected direct benefits (or lack thereof), it
may be in that person's best interests to be governed by a policy that puts her at risk of
being enrolled in studies of that nature.2 1 Whether that is in fact the case would
depend on whether the risks to which she will be exposed as a result of the policy are
outweighed by the benefits she is likely to receive from other studies that could not
have been conducted unless the policy existed. Ultimately, the goal for public policy
should be to create a rule that provides a net benefit to the persons who will be directly
affected-that is, to those individuals who would bear the risk of being enrolled in
studies that the policy authorizes, but who also would have to forego the benefits of
any studies that the policy does not allow.
The claim that it may be in the best interests of incapacitated persons to be
governed by a public policy that authorizes surrogate consent to no-direct-benefit
research does not depend on proving that such a policy would necessarily provide
greater benefits to each and every individual. In fact, it is possible that some people
would end up worse off in such a system, as they might be enrolled in no-direct-benefit
studies without receiving any benefits from research performed with other
incapacitated people. For example, this might be true for persons who have conditions
that were inadequately studied in the past. While such persons might benefit from
concurrent or future research conducted with other incapacitated people, they would
not be able to reap the benefits of any prior research. However, when we say that a
particular course of action is in individuals' best interests, we are making a statement
about the ex ante probability of benefit and harm, not a guarantee that every single
person will necessarily benefit ex post. By way of analogy, if treatment A has a
seventy-five percent success rate and treatment B has a twenty-five percent success
rate, and there is no way to determine ex ante which treatment would work better for
any particular person, it would be in every individual's best interests to receive
treatment A--even though some people might actually end up worse off than if they
had been given treatment B. 202
201. The possibility that individuals may be better off being governed by a policy that leads
to negative outcomes in specific situations, while seemingly paradoxical, is in fact widely
recognized. For example, this is the premise underlying the widely accepted theory of "rule
utilitarianism." See John Lawrence Hill, A Utilitarian Theory of Duress, 84 IOWA L. REv. 275,
317 (1999) (explaining that rule utilitarianism "holds that one should follow the rule that tends
to maximize happiness in similar cases even if doing so does not maximize happiness in this
particular case") (emphasis added).
202. A well-known example of this ex ante approach to risk-benefit assessment is John
Rawls's social contract approach to political justification. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 15-19 (rev. ed. 1999). Rawls states that a system of rules is legitimate if it would be
accepted by individuals deliberating behind a "veil of ignorance"-that is, without knowing
what particular social advantages or status they would have once the rules are implemented. Id.
Rawls argues that behind this veil, persons would rationally choose a system that granted
everyone as much liberty as possible, as long as everyone else had the same amount of liberty,
and they would apportion benefits and burdens equally, unless an unequal distribution would
make everyone, especially the less fortunate, better off. Id. The approach proposed in this
Article is consistent with this Rawlsian analysis. From behind a veil of ignorance, it is likely
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A systemic approach to assessing the best interests of incapacitated persons reflects
aspects of both the communitarian and individual rights approaches discussed in Part
III. Like communitarian theories, the approach presented here does not treat
individuals as atomistic units unconnected to the rest of society. Instead, the proposed
approach looks at individuals as affected not only by what happens to them when they
are enrolled in studies, but also by what happens to other people like them (i.e., by
research conducted with other incapacitated people). At the same time, it rejects those
aspects of communitarianism that focus on group interests at the expense of the
individual. Thus, under the proposed approach, a surrogate consent policy would be
justifiable only to the extent that it provides a net benefit to the same individuals who
will bear the burdens of the policy. In other words, the justification for nonconsensual
research is not that incapacitated people should accept risks for the benefit of others,
but that they should accept risks if doing so is necessary to increase the likely benefits
to them.
The argument presented here is different from the claim that incapacitated persons
can legitimately be exposed to risky research in exchange for their receipt of "decent
food, shelter, and care., 20 3 The risk-in-exchange-for-care argument claims that it is
appropriate to impose burdens on incapacitated persons in exchange for unrelated
benefits-that is, benefits that could also be provided without requiring the recipients
to accept the risk of being enrolled in research without their personal authorization. By
contrast, under the approach proposed here, incapacitated persons could be exposed to
the risks of research only to the extent that doing so is necessary to provide them with
benefits that would otherwise be unattainable. Thus, incapacitated people are not being
asked to make sacrifices in order to pay back a debt to society. Rather, the theory is
that allowing surrogate consent, even to some types of no-direct-benefit research, is
ultimately better for incapacitated people than a system in which surrogate consent is
not allowed. 2° 4
that people would accept some risk of being enrolled in studies without their personal
authorization, but only if there were no other way that they could reap the benefits of improved
medical treatments, and only if those benefits would have greater value to them than the risk of
being made an involuntary research subject. While such an approach would create a certain
degree of inequality, insofar as the risk of being enrolled in research involuntarily would fall
entirely on persons without decision-making capacity, the inequality is necessary to promote
better medical treatments for those who would be disproportionately burdened.
203. CANTOR, supra note 133, at 187.
204. Although the argument presented here represents a departure from the way that risk-
benefit assessment is usually carried out in health care, the idea of evaluating individuals' best
interests from a systemic perspective has been advanced in other legal areas. For example,
David Rosenberg relies on a similar analysis to explain why it is in everyone's best interest to
adopt a rule requiring mass tort cases to be adjudicated by class actions, as opposed to
individual litigation. See David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only
Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REv. 831 (2002). While such a rule would impose
burdens on some people, by preventing them from bringing individual lawsuits that might offer
them greater financial rewards than participating in a class action, those burdens would be
outweighed by the fact that a mandatory system is more likely to "maximize individual welfare
by securing optimal deterrence and insurance." Id. at 832. The structure of Rosenberg's
argument is similar to the argument presented here. In both situations, the claim is that everyone
is better off by accepting limits on individual autonomy, even if those limits impose burdens on
certain people, if those limits are necessary to create a system that ultimately maximizes
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This approach also explains why it is ethically acceptable to enroll incapacitated
people in research they have not personally authorized despite the fact that the law
does not require similar sacrifices from persons who have decision-making capacity.
For conditions that affect decisionally capable persons, there is no need to deviate from
our usual commitment to individual autonomy, because whatever research needs to be
conducted can take place with subjects who have voluntarily agreed to participate. 20 5
By contrast, important research on capacity-impairing conditions could not be
conducted if we limited such research to individuals whose desire to participate could
clearly be established. 206 Thus, the justification for policies that impose greater
burdens on incapacitated people than on people with capacity is that incapacitated
people would be even worse off without such policies because they would lose the
potential long-term benefits of medical progress.
In order for a policy authorizing surrogate consent to research to provide a long-
term net benefit to incapacitated people, it would have to satisfy several conditions.
First, to be able to say that members of the target population would be better off in a
system that allows them to be enrolled in research even if their wishes are uncertain,
research with incapacitated subjects should offer the affected population potential
benefits that would otherwise be unattainable. Thus, incapacitated persons should be
used as subjects only in studies that cannot be conducted with competent persons, and
such research should be limited to conditions of unique concern to persons with
impaired decision-making capacity. It would be inappropriate to enroll incapacitated
persons in studies directed at conditions that affect the general population (e.g., cancer
research) unless participating in the study is genuinely in the best interests of the
individual subjects.
These conditions are consistent with recommendations proposed by other
commentators. 2  However, the framework proposed here also suggests another
condition that has not been part of the existing policy discussion. This condition stems
directly from the trade-off on which the entire framework is grounded-that is, the
assumption that incapacitated persons will benefit from research performed with other
persons like them, in exchange for accepting comparable risks for the benefit of
similarly situated persons. Reasonable people would be unlikely to accept this trade-off
unless they had some assurance of actually receiving the treatments resulting from
research conducted with other incapacitated subjects. Thus, an acceptable policy on
research with incapacitated subjects should include mechanisms to provide such
persons access to the fruits of medical research.
individual well-being.
205. Of course, this statement must be tempered by the fact that the ideals of informed
consent are often not realized in practice. See, e.g., Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Remaining Faithful
to the Promises Given: Maintaining Standards in Changing Times, 32 SEToNHALLL. REv. 563,
567 (2002). Many research subjects agree to participate because of a "therapeutic
misconception"-the mistaken belief that everything that happens to them in research is
motivated by the researchers' commitment to their personal medical needs, rather than the
researchers' pursuit of general knowledge. Rebecca Dresser, The Ubiquity and Utility of the
Therapeutic Misconception, 19 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 271, 271 (2002). These problems
demonstrate the importance of continued efforts to improve the process of informed consent to
research.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 125-29.
207. NBAC REPORT, supra note 57, at 55-56; NYSAWG REPORT, supra note 111, at 28.
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A variety of mechanisms could be created to ensure that incapacitated persons have
access to treatments resulting from research with other persons. For example, as a
condition of conducting research with decisionally impaired subjects, research
sponsors could be required to undertake measures to ensure better access to
medications to members of the population being studied. Such an obligation would be
similar to policies applicable to research conducted in developing countries. The
guidelines of the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences state that
sponsors of research in developing countries should ensure that "any intervention or
product developed, or knowledge generated, will be made reasonably available for the
benefit of that population or community." 208 Some commentators have urged sponsors
to take an even broader view of their obligations to research participants. One policy
group recommended that, in addition to providing the products of research to the host
country, sponsors should consider measures such as "enhancing health care or research
facilities, providing critical equipment, other physical infrastructure such as roads or
vehicles, training of health care and research staff, and training of individuals in
research ethics."
2 °9
In addition to expected benefits, the risks of a study are also important
considerations. On the one hand, a rule permitting incapacitated people to be enrolled
in minimally or moderately risky research can be justified by the benefits those persons
are likely to receive from similar research conducted with other incapacitated people.
In such a system, it is unlikely that anyone would be subjected to burdens that are
disproportionate to the benefits they can expect to receive. On the other hand, there is
less justification for a system that would permit incapacitated people to be enrolled in
208. COUNCIL FOR INT'L ORG. OF MED. SCI. & WORLD HEALTH ORG., INTERNATIONAL
ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SuBJECTs Guidelines 51-
53(2002).
209. Participants in the 2001 Conference on Ethical Aspects of Research in Developing
Countries, Fair Benefits for Research in Developing Countries, in ETHICAL AND REGULATORY
ASPECTS OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 354, 354 (Ezekiel J. Emmanuel, Robert A. Crouch, John D.
Arras, Jonathan D. Moreno & Christine Grady eds., 2003). It might be argued that offering
incapacitated persons greater access to health care in exchange for enrolling in research would
constitute an "undue inducement." A possible response to this argument is that concerns about
undue inducement are unwarranted as long as the risks of a study are not excessive. As Ezekiel
Emanuel argues, "[undue inducement is when we offer people goods to assume clearly
excessive and unreasonable risks." Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Undue Inducement: Nonsense on Stilts?
AM. J. BIOETHICS, Sept./Oct. 2005, at 9, 11 (emphasis in original). In addition, to the extent that
the concern with undue inducement is that it compromises the voluntariness of an individual's
decision to enroll in research, see, e.g., Harold Y. Vanderpool, A Quartet of Criticisms, AM. J.
BIOETHICS, Sept./Oct. 2005, at 16, 17, this concern is attenuated in studies in which consent is
provided by a surrogate. In research with competent persons, establishing the voluntariness of
the subject's decision is critical because the main justification for exposing competent persons
to risks is that they have voluntarily agreed to assume them. See supra text accompanying notes
74-76. By contrast, under the proposed framework, the acceptability of research with
incapacitated persons depends less on the surrogate's motivations for consenting and more on
characteristics of the study itself-specifically, whether it fits within a policy that provides a net
benefit to incapacitated people. Because the surrogate's reasons for consenting do not determine
the ethical acceptability of the research, there is less reason to be concerned about the "purity"
of the surrogate's choice.
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studies involving high risks 210 without a corresponding direct benefit-for example, a
symptom-provoking study involving a significant risk of serious injury. If high-risk
studies were permitted, individuals would be subjected to significant burdens that
could very well outweigh the benefits they could expect to receive from research
conducted with other incapacitated people.
Thus, the approach proposed here suggests that surrogate consent should not be a
sufficient basis for enrolling incapacitated persons in high-risk, no-direct-benefit
studies. Instead, such research should be limited to persons whose wishes to participate
can be established through clear and convincing evidence. NYSAWG reached a
similar conclusion; it would have limited no-direct-benefit studies involving "more
than a minor increase over minimal risk" to persons who had executed a "research
advance directive" that specifically stated their willingness to be enrolled in that kind
of research.21' Theoretically, it might be possible to clearly establish an individual's
desire to participate in such research even in the absence of a written advance
directive, 212 but a bright line rule requiring advance written instructions seems
appropriate here, given the potential for abuse.
B. The Role of Surrogate Decision Makers
The proposed approach requires decisions to be made at three different levels:
administrative agencies, IRBs, and individual surrogates. First, administrative agencies
(primarily DHHS) would promulgate regulations identifying the type of studies for
which surrogate consent is appropriate, taking into account the considerations
discussed in the previous section. Such regulations could be modeled on the existing
regulations governing research with children, which among other things, place limits
on the level of permissible risk.213 Once the criteria for approving studies have been
adopted at the regulatory level, the determination of whether a particular study satisfies
those criteria would either be left to local IRBs or, for particularly sensitive studies, a
national board.214
The more difficult question under the proposed framework is determining the role
that surrogates would play. As explained above, the premise of the framework is that it
is appropriate to enroll incapacitated people in research without their authorization if
210. "High risk" should be defined as "more than a minor increase over minimal risk," the
standard used in the existing federal regulations on research with children. See 45 C.F.R. §
46.406 (2008). A "minor increase" is by definition "minor," and preventing this minor increase
could exclude many important types of research, such as studies involving brain imaging. See
supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
211. NYSAWG REPORT, supra note 111, at 32-33. By contrast, NBAC would allow
surrogate consent to more-than-minimal-risk, no-direct-benefit research without the subject's
advance authorization, provided that the study was approved by a special national panel and the
subject's surrogate consents. NBAC, supra note 57, at 61.
212. See, e.g., In re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607, 613-14 (N.Y. 1988)
(holding that clear and convincing evidence of an incapacitated person's decision to refuse life-
sustaining treatment need not be in writing).
213. Ideally, the regulations would also address other issues that arise in research with
incapacitated subjects, such as the process of determining incapacity.
214. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.407 (2008) (requiring the approval of a national board for
pediatric research that would otherwise not be approved under the regulatory standards).
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the risks to which they will be exposed are commensurate with the benefits they can
expect to receive from research conducted with other incapacitated people. Assuming
that standard is met, one might ask why surrogate consent should also be necessary. If
surrogates have the option of refusing to consent to any type of research for particular
individuals, those people would get all the benefits of the system without assuming any
of the risks-in other words, there could be a substantial free-rider problem. 215 This
danger arguably suggests that participating in research should be mandatory for
incapacitated people, assuming an IRB has determined that a study meets the criteria
outlined in the previous section.
However, a system in which incapacitated persons could be enrolled in research
without first obtaining consent from a surrogate would have several significant
drawbacks. First, one of the benefits of requiring surrogate consent is that it provides a
mechanism for overseeing what happens to incapacitated subjects in research. 216 If it
were permissible to enroll incapacitated people in research without a surrogate's
authorization, both researchers and IRBs might be less vigilant about limiting the risks
to which incapacitated people are exposed.
In addition, requiring surrogate consent can help identify those individuals for
whom enrolling in research presents an unusually significant imposition. Even in
studies classified as "minimal risk," what is minimal risk for most people can
constitute a significant burden on others. For example, as NBAC observed, "a
diversion in routine can, for some dementia patients, 'constitute real threats to needed
order and stability, contribute to already high levels of frustration and confusion, or
result in a variety of health complications.' 217 Participating in research may also pose
a special burden on individuals with religious or moral objections to particular medical
interventions.
Requiring surrogate consent also shows respect for the family as the primary locus
of decision making for incapacitated persons. In Part III, it was argued that the notion
of family autonomy provides an insufficient basis for exposing incapacitated people to
the risks of no-direct-benefit research. 218 However, that does not mean that a family's
objections to enrolling their relatives in research are not entitled to respect. One need
not accept an open-ended principle of "family autonomy" to recognize that cutting
families out of the process entirely would be disrespectful of an important social
institution.
Finally, it is simply unrealistic to think that a mandatory system would ever be
adopted in our society. Despite the free-rider problem, conscripting incapacitated
persons into research without even asking their families just seems offensive. Any
proposal to adopt a mandatory system would therefore generate substantial public
opposition.
215. Cf. Rosamond Rhodes, Rethinking Research Ethics, AM. J. BIoETHIcs, Jan./Feb. 2005,
at 7, 15 (aruging that all people should be required to perform "periodic service as research
subjects," and suggesting that "[t]o withhold endorsement from such a policy would be taking
advantage of the kindness of others-that is, being a free-rider on the system and failing to
recognize the moral equality of others").
216. See Dresser, supra note 60, at 27.
217. NBAC REPORT, supra note 57, at 44.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 173-79.
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What then are the implications of this Article's shift in perspective for the process
of surrogate decision making? First, the approach proposed here underscores the
importance of ensuring that surrogates understand the differences between
participating in research and receiving ordinary medical treatment. If a study offers no
potential direct benefits to subjects, that fact should be made clear to surrogates in
unambiguous language. 21 9 In studies involving a prospect of direct benefit, the
researchers should explain how receiving an investigational intervention as part of a
research study differs from receiving that same intervention in the context of an
individualized physician-patient relationship. 220 They should also tell surrogates
whether participating in the study is the only way to receive the investigational
intervention, or whether that intervention could also be obtained without participating
in research.22'
Second, the proposed approach requires modifying the substantive standards
surrogates are asked to apply in deciding whether to enroll incapacitated persons in
research. This does not mean that the wishes/best interests standards should be
completely abandoned. In some cases, the surrogate may have knowledge of an
incapacitated person's wishes about being a research subject. In other cases,
participating in research might be a reasonable choice from the perspective of a best
interests analysis. However, researchers should not mislead surrogates into thinking
that they will usually be able to justify decisions to enroll incapacitated people in
research under the wishes/best interests framework that governs ordinary treatment
decisions. Instead, as part of the informed consent process, surrogates should be told
that they are being asked to deviate from the incapacitated person's immediate interests
in order to provide potential benefits to other incapacitated people-just as the
prospective subject may have benefited from comparable risks assumed by other
incapacitated people in similar situations. Because the surrogate's authority to consent
is grounded in a policy designed to promote the best interests of incapacitated persons,
the surrogate need not feel that consenting would be disrespectful or exploitative of the
prospective subject. However, surrogates will ultimately have to rely on their own
moral framework in deciding whether this rationale provides an acceptable justification
for them.
Finally, the framework developed in this Article suggests that surrogates should see
their roles as extending beyond the incapacitated person's experience in the specific
study to which the surrogate is consenting. Because the justification for exposing
incapacitated people to the risks of research is that they may benefit from similar
research performed with other incapacitated people, a surrogate who consents to
research should assume an obligation to advocate for the subject's access to the
benefits derived from other medical research. One way to carry out this responsibility
would be to ensure that the IRB has imposed sufficient conditions on the research
sponsors to promote incapacitated persons' access to the fruits of medical research,222
and to take action against the sponsors if those conditions are not satisfied.
219. See Nancy M.P. King, Defining and Describing Benefit Appropriately in Clinical
Trials, 28 J.L. MED. & ETmcs 332, 334 (2000) ("When benefit cannot reasonably be expected,
the consent form should say, '[Y]ou will not benefit.'").
220. See supra text accompanying notes 33-40.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 46-50.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 205-06.
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In addition to providing a more coherent justification for authorizing surrogate
consent to medical research, the approach proposed in this Article should help
surrogates better understand the nature of the decisions they are being asked to make.
Instead of telling surrogates that consenting to research itself provides a benefit to
incapacitated persons by carrying out their wishes or promoting their best interests, the
proposed approach emphasizes that participating in research is often more of a burden
than a benefit. The justification for imposing these burdens is that the subjects are
likely to be better off in the long run because they will have access to the fruits of
research conducted with other incapacitated people. Surrogates would therefore be
encouraged to ensure that this promise of broader access is actually carried out.
CONCLUSION
As the amount of research with incapacitated human subjects continues to increase,
the lack of clear legal authority for this research is becoming increasingly untenable.
Previous attempts to authorize and regulate this research have been unsuccessful in
part because of their lack of a coherent and persuasive ethical framework. This Article
seeks to move the policy debate forward by providing a new way of thinking about the
ethics of research with incapacitated persons. Because the framework developed here
is grounded in a commitment to the long-term best interests of incapacitated persons, it
responds to the criticism that authorizing research with incapacitated persons
constitutes a form of exploitation. At the same time, because it clearly differentiates the
justification for surrogate consent to research from the principles underlying surrogate
consent to medical treatment, it shows why laws that simply authorize surrogate
consent without any significant limitations do not provide an appropriate model.
Finally, by shifting the focus away from the often irrelevant wishes/best interests
inquiry, it provides the foundation for a more honest and useful message to surrogates
about what is at stake in their decisions.
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